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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The paper researches the viable options for Hamas as a case study in the development 
of a peace paradigm through answering the question of ‘What should Hamas do, 
while under siege, to act responsibly in favor of the interests of its constituency?’ By 
comparing the logics of social constructivist and realist theories as methods of 
analysis in addressing the formulation, operationalization and social utility generated 
from ideologies, and specifically, Islamism, and the various forms it has taken shape 
in a post-9/11-postmodern world. While addressing the historical aspect and sources 
of ideological power that constitute our social reality through meanings, morals and 
rituals, derivations are made from the harsh conditions of an environment confined to 
conflict that transpired into Hamas’ structural foundation. Furthermore, social 
constructivist theory is tested in the envisioning of imperative re-imaginings of 
society to consequently improve relations of Hamas with their political rivals, Fatah 
and Israel and most importantly the people of Gaza, by adhering to a moral 'ought' 
rather than the reactionary events manifest in the 'is' making social reality a construct 
for a ‘transcendental is’. The paper also proposes that ‘real’ peace stems from the 
cultural interpretation of human social imagination/consciousness of rival groupings 
in protracted conflicts, and as such advocates for communicative engagement 
(equality) rather than strategic engagement (carrot/stick thematic) and power 
dynamics (zero-sum games), to achieve reconciliation between rivaling populations 
based on just and shared norms within social, political and cultural interpretations 
instead of the dominant views of the culture of political realism and notions of 
compromise and the state. 
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Chronology of Arguments: 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter one describes the methodology used to qualitatively explore the research 
question of What should Hamas do, while under siege, to act responsibly for the 
people of Gaza? And resolving, for the Palestinian people the protracted conflict. The 
chapter provides a theoretical framework that briefly introduces the foundations and 
main concepts of analysis of the conflict, Realism and Social Constructivism within 
IR theory, while the remainder of the chapter focuses on the in-depth framing of the 
application of both theories in the peace and conflict resolution discourse. 
 
Chapter two starts off by introducing the three constituents of a constructivist ‘social 
reality’ as sources for ideological power, namely, Meaning, Morals and Ritual. Then 
continues to account for the historical aspects behind the formulation of Hamas and 
their structure to better represent the ideological and contextual background for the 
three aforementioned elements.  The Structuring of Hamas and its leadership are then 
reviewed to reflect on the harsh conditions deemed necessary for the legitimacy and 
expansion of their ideological project and cultural belonging to the tradition of 
Political Islam, which in turn is cross-examined with other Islamist movements to see 
whether the ideology is homogenous world-wide and compatible with democracy or 
whether Hamas proposes a different view to fundamentalist claims in a post- 9/11- 
‘modern’ world. 
 
Chapter three questions what is Hamas supplying in terms of ideology and political 
culture to its people and how this can be seen as beneficial for their people in their 
circumstance by exploring gaps between the ‘is’ when compared to the ‘ought’ and 
inquiring the roots of Hamas as an organization that practices consultation and 
pragmatism, to see to what extent do they hold and adhere to the ideal principles of 
morality. 
 
Chapter four looks closely at relations between Hamas and the State of Israel, 
questioning the validity of choices made to engage in a war, by negotiating the 
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difference between the culture of political realism in formulating dichotomous 
strategic perspectives aimed at deterrence, in contrast to the constructivist agenda of 
communicative engagement to try and define what ‘real’ peace could essentially mean 
through the practicalities of both theories amongst the moral dilemmas of their 
ideologies. 
 
Chapter five calibrates the role of ideologies with identity formations to conclude 
with a descriptive analysis of interactive relations between Hamas with Gazans and 
Fatah in the domestic political arena to investigate the answers of whether Hamas acts 
favorably as a governing body and what reform, if necessary would be advantageous 
for the social utility of their ideology to overcome internal and external conflicts.  
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Chapter One: The Conflation of Rigorous 
Social Sciences in Humanities 
 
 
 
Methodology: 
 
 
A primary challenge faced in Hamas as a case study was to describe the relations of 
the political organization with regards to their responsibilities towards the people in 
Gaza, the fundamental topic of discussion, without touching upon its relations with 
Israel and the locomotion of studies on the Middle East conflict; an overly-exhausted 
topic.  Yet, to explore the relations through either realist or constructivist analysis, it 
is imperative that two sets of relations be examined; that with the State of Israeli and 
with the Gaza population simultaneously, with Hamas at a pivotal core.  By doing so, 
the research in attempting to answer the question ‘What should Hamas do under 
beleaguered conditions to act responsibly for its constituency?’ will not include the 
set of exogenous factors such as the Israeli state policies and Palestinian civil society 
and policies of rival political factions such as Fatah, in formulating answers. 
However, their respective positions will be addressed from the point of view of 
Hamas and the policies it shapes around these circumstantial interactions; Policies 
that are dictated by the inherent ideology, political and cultural identities therein. 
 
For the sake of this study, the main classifications have been identified by how key 
agents/organizations and specifically Hamas interpret the conflict and a ‘double 
hermeneutic’ is required to investigate further what these interpretations mean and 
what action precedes and proceeds from them based on a series of interviews that are 
documented by Middle East Policy Council (MEPC). The study will carry a form of 
phenomenological interpretation with noesis at its essence allowing the focus to shift 
to the subjective pole of experiences and what it constitutes of streaming 
consciousness into the world that can be derived from the primary data (Bullington, 
1984:52).  As author of the document the so-called ‘objectivity’ of the study lies in 
the situated knowledge or habitus accumulated from having roots from the region and 
a prevailing global identity through a history of western education and exposure. The 
impartiality towards beliefs in both the Muslim world and the rest of the world creates 
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a sense of self-respect and respect of others based on a short yet conditioned 
experience that invokes a radical constructivist look at the conflict in which 
reflexivity is based on a hermeneutic relationship with reality (Delanty, 2000:112).  
That is not to say that by utilizing such theory that reductionism is to be presupposed 
as an adequate criteria for the critical analysis, but to wisely follow Feyerabend’s 
teachings in Chalmers (2004:156), an anarchist theory is but most relevant to 
encompass all logic when critically viewing the shortcomings of the aforementioned 
strata’s conflict based on the diverse issues of global politics, cultural translation and 
interpretation. Any typologies attributed to certain groups studied are merely in order 
for classification and do not represent the common naïve stereotypes they 
predominantly signify. The study will try to avoid binary structures reenacted by 
notions of good or bad, right or wrong, but address the immediate humanitarian 
concerns and pressing issues deluded by notions of strong and weak, hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic instead, so as not to indulge in any tangible religious debates that 
would fragment the vital concepts of the study. 
 
All primary data used in the study to present normative and empirical evidence that 
support arguments for the research question, are based on literature review and a 
discourse analysis on the case study.  To correlate and test the findings a series of 
interviews were to be conducted with people from Gaza.  Interviews were to be 
carried out as supplements for the analysis to allow interpretations to be standardized 
and answer the research question more personally. Due to the difficulty of travel to 
war-stricken zones, the further exasperation of the situation in the recent months in 
Gaza as preludes to this research project, the interviews were to be done on an online 
medium. The targeted sample for interviewing consisted of any person from Gaza that 
was well educated, and was not politically affiliated to any political parties.  
Reasoning for this sampling process is the abundance of interviews with Hamas 
officials and their interpretation of the conflict as well as the dominant descriptions of 
popular opinion in Gaza.  By refining the sample, the target group for interviewing 
became the extreme opposite on the spectrum to provide a holistic image of both 
majority and minorities in Gaza, as such, Christians were asked to be interviewed 
from the region, whom presumably would be a lot more critical towards the views of 
Hamas, indicative of feelings of exclusion by an Islamic organization. Of the eleven 
people contacted through email, only two interviewees showed willingness to be 
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interviewed, a Christian female from Gaza and a well-established Christian male 
journalist, both of which were in their thirties, however to date they were unable to 
provide time for this endeavour and their views could be incorporated at a later date. 
 
The focus of the interview questions was more on feelings and preferences, ultimately 
in a semi-structured format (Flick 2006, 150).  The questions start with a more open 
ended nature, so as to understand the interviewee’s views of Hamas and its relations 
to Israel and their constituency broadly, then more hypotheses directed questions were 
presented, and finally confronting the interviewee’s opinion with counter arguments 
to see if their opinion still holds. The questioning followed the ‘funnel’ approach, as 
open-ended questions were followed by more specific question to clarify and verify 
positions. This form of interviewing ‘ semi-standardized’ was chosen for its 
explorative element of ‘subjective theories’, since the study assumes that there is a 
difference in peoples’ opinions when trying to define Hamas, either as a legitimate 
political entity or a terrorist organization or both (Flick 2006, 152-154). 
 
To compensate for the shortcomings and lack of interview data presented, some 
simple reflections were extracted through online polling of SOLIYA facilitators. 
Soliya, is an online program created to discuss the dialectics of East-West relations 
and especially the clash between the Western world and the Arab/Muslim world with 
regards to culture, politics and religion.  This peace and conflict resolution medium 
entails groups of eight to nine students from universities worldwide, half of which 
constitute one of the differing worlds in an online discussion.  Some of the opinions 
of the facilitators were incorporated in the study as results for testing certain 
hypotheses in a focus group format, by posting two poll questions addressed to all 
facilitating members of the community, who had undergone a 5 week training on 
conflict resolution tools for mediation, to derive some indications on world-wide 
support for Hamas, by asking if they thought that Hamas was acting responsibly 
towards the people of Gaza? And secondly a question directed to three nationalities 
the British, French and Germans, asking them to state which of the two other 
nationalities do they have a positive cultural attitude towards.  The reason for the 
second poll being, to test whether war and events shape peaceful relations or rather it 
is the socialization of cultures that pertains to the notion of ‘real’ peace.   
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Theoretical Framework and Background: 
 
 
The qualitative study revolves around the juxtaposition of the two classic rivaling 
theories in modern social science, Realism and Social Constructivism. While most of 
the analysis of events will be described through the broadly construed, realist lens, 
and dominant realist peace models will be scrutinized to measure their success within 
the context of the Hamas-Israeli-Gazan relations. Analysis of peace building 
initiatives and establishment of ‘real’ peace will be socially constructed as well as 
providing a normative discussion on possible constructivist practices that Hamas 
should partake if it is to adhere to the best practices in governance with a special 
interest in the protection of the Gaza population and why they should do so. 
 
Thies (2002:149-155) presents the foundation on which the theoretical framework for 
the paper is driven by depicting the shortcomings of the realist tradition in conflict 
resolution and theory.  The first analytical assumption co-opted by realist conflict 
theory is in accepting that the in-groups create stories about the out-group to establish 
some form of solidarity, these stories may or may not be fiction, but their influence in 
identity politics is fundamental to their ideology. This notion although partially true 
does not holistically explain the demise or apathy towards both (in and out) groups 
when gazed upon from an outsider or mediator’s view.  A relevant example would be 
the Israeli-Arab conflict, if we were to believe what Marx propagates that ideologies 
gain power through false consciousness with his more than stellar quote on religion 
being ‘the opiate of the masses…’ then the whole world would have been able to 
accommodate the rivaling ideologies diffused from the region and clear cut alliances 
would have emerged from the crisis and a further spread of the ideologies would have 
undergone. 
 
In Snyder’s account of Michael Mann’s conception on the anatomy of power, they 
refute such allegations and present this illusory form of creating a self fulfilling 
prophecy to provoke enemies, consequently creating a new and plausible role of 
defense as one of four centre pieces to the puzzle of why do followers follow? And in 
the elaborate arts of ‘demand and supply for ideology’, but suggest that it is an 
unlikely form of ideology to spread, since in their constructivist beliefs’ effective 
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ideology transcends both truth and falsity in existence and cannot be tested or fully 
experienced and ‘therein lies its distinctive power’ (Snyder, 2002:308). Before 
dismissing such ideals on the basis of abstraction or reduction try to retain from 
history or current events, as realists, an ideology that was premised on uni-lateral 
aggression that has gained any popularity beyond its cultural boundaries?  The Serbs 
are a recent example of such incidence and so was the war in Iraq, maintaining that 
the falsity in promises of ideologies cannot be prolonged, which could be another 
explanation for why ideologies are constantly shifting.  Regardless, in the short term 
such incidents have proven successful and can be attributed to many separatists that 
reverted to violence in order to achieve independence such as East Timor.  But then 
the question becomes whether they were able to achieve a stable peace or not? But 
before we enter the diabolical debate between the rival theories and tangent 
questioning to their relevance in our case study, a more conclusive illustration of the 
respective logic should be transcribed.   
 
 
The Wizard of ‘Was’: Realism 
 
 
 
Realism has for a long time shaped the analytic tradition on interwar literature by 
focusing more on capabilities and events through structures to provide a reactionary 
set of policies to stop wars.  Theoretically, their boundaries of addressing such 
conflicts lays within the power of the state, even their most pragmatic idealists that 
ascribe to an a-historical form of analysis similar to that of constructivism, have the 
same tendency. Yet still their proposition lies within the norms of power, with their 
idealist agenda of producing a world federation, quintessentially embodied by 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies which remains a 
territorially bound division but with a higher global authority as a solution (Thies, 
155). Their reasoning for such derives from their preference to structure and 
capabilities as a more reliable function than normative intentions of morality (Lynch, 
2002: 207). From these foundations come the Neo-Realists in our post-modern times, 
Brysk (2002) shows that their approach to IR is taking the attention away from most 
social or normative meanings towards the material, anomalies are treated in the same 
manner as they are explained in terms of ‘objective’ economic and security interests. 
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So how does this explain what Brysk calls the post-imperial families that despite the 
economic and strategic decline of their relation an overwhelming sense of obligation 
remains intact? France and Haiti is a very good example of such anomalies that 
realists fail to explain fully.   
 
The outdated yet highly appreciated theories concerning post-colonialism and post-
imperialism demonstrate that realism is confined to laws governing our realities based 
on events, where conflict of interest becomes stagnant and independent from moral 
duty. Throughout their studies the search is always for meanings an in the unlikely 
event of finding purpose, it remains unacknowledged.  Which is why scholars such as 
Carr and Thies (2002) recognize realism’s lack of a finite goal that is indispensable to 
effective political thinking, even when it is there and it usually is because of the 
realists tendency to dismiss ‘ideals’ as pre-scientific history, which ultimately is a 
‘blindness to the realities of international affairs’ (Thies, 2002:166). The realist 
concern is with the security of the individual which is directly linked to that of the 
sovereignty of any given state, which becomes a tool for justifying resorting to war at 
certain circumstances, for the state must appeal and satisfy the ego’s of its 
subordinates, to reach higher levels of autonomy (Thies, 2002:159).  This practice has 
become mainstreamed to war and resistance as a form of political survival, present in 
almost all corners of our world, and in our specific context becomes omnipresent in 
the struggle between the Israelis and Hamas/Palestinians. So how do realist actually 
explain their respective reality. Reality is divided into four classes, the Actual 
represented by the “is’ or ‘was’, the probable which is likely to be, the possible of 
what can be and finally the desirable what ‘ought’ to happen which is placed on the 
pedestal of ideals (Wright 1955:11). Through this typology, realists have managed to 
infer that utopianism is a form of political idealism, but deny it from ever happening 
or being achievable through progress, as it does not contain the core assumption of 
significant security and power factors in any human society, proving the obvious bias 
towards suppressing cultural anarchy as a form of regulation and replacing it with 
hierarchy in their hegemonic ‘stability’ literature, proving that their stringent belief in 
laws and structure, provide a much more cohesive scientific relation, but lacks 
immensely any theory of change and could probably be the reason for state 
sovereignty and world government remaining exclusive and not simultaneously 
indoctrinated (Thies, 20002: 165-168).   
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Below are diagrams that illustrate how realism operates: 
 
       
Figure 1(a) Illustration of Realism    Figure 1(b) Graph of Realism 
 
 
Figures 1(a) and (b) show that realism is depicted as a circular set of relations set by 
boundaries that are impossible to cross, while our variables the State of Israel and 
Hamas are but objects revolving in a spiral of dogmatic beliefs and negotiation, with 
the time axis being a form of stability and a desirable objective in the relation.  
However, the threshold of violent action is consequential to the potency of these 
ideologically politicized beliefs and thoughts, once its passed acts of violence for the 
preservation of self-interest become justifiable as a reaction to ‘real’ events. That 
strict interpretation of conflict however cannot explain a shooting of a schoolboy or 
bombing of a discothèque except as reprisals for political developments, either the 
breakdown of negotiation channels, harassment at checkpoints or as conspiracy 
theories want everyone to believe that it is the proximity to a peace deal that lead to 
provocations to protect a favorable status quo. The power dynamics of the relation are 
represented in the size of each object and the speed in which it revolves around these 
set conditions, while Israel represents a symmetrical and stable cyclic frequency, 
Hamas is portrayed in an a-symmetrical erratic wave being the weaker of the two with 
limited accessibility to both action and negotiation within the power dynamic. For a 
clearer picture a 3D plane is illustrated in figure 1(c) on the following page shows that 
in fact what on a traditional 2D plane, seemingly, is a non linear relation, is false, for 
the relation is bound by a constant dependence on time and a static conflict threshold 
(grey plane) that both agents relentlessly and inevitably must collide at, showing a 
very realistic yet volatile connection between the two rivals. 
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Figure 1(c) 3D Illustration of Realism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructivism: ‘Turning the Page’ for a new social 
imaginary in ‘Ought’ 
 
 
This theory is encapsulated in its emancipation from objective conditions, played out 
in material gain or political interests in re-orienting policy to socially construct 
change.  For constructivists, International relations is both the normative contexts and 
subjective identities that filters how social groups, anything from a tribe to a clan to 
an entire nation, should understand and attain their goals, which are shaped 
fundamentally by shared meanings and norms (Brysk, 2002: 267-269).  The modes of 
relations between social structures and individual actors constitute one another within 
those shared meanings and are reproduced or modified by the on-going interactions, 
as the inter-subjective constructs represented by individual actors underlie interests, 
which are henceforth shaping policy (Brysk, 2002: 269-270). In that sense, norms and 
ideals are not superfluous and are a valid and more intrinsic characteristic that shapes 
politics and can or should be operationalized. Therefore, constructivist practitioners 
reject any form of analysis that measures capabilities invariably to social contexts, as 
their belief is that state interest is always deeply rooted in identity politics and is not 
just an accumulation of domestic private interests (Lynch, 2002: 207).  
 
Wendt in Thies (2002) best describes constructivism as ‘Structural Idealism’, where 
as, idealism is explained as the culture of state life that depends on actions taken, 
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meaning that the state alone can promote culture and has the ability to transform it, 
burdening the state with the responsibility of keeping its culture intact. Wendt prefers 
the Kantian outlook of collective action under an authority acting towards peace as a 
plausible analysis of governments in times of conflict, insinuating to one of the 
interstitial cores of the constructivist school as a conflation or fusion of idealism with 
realism (Wendt in Thies, 2002:172). Here the collective identity ascribed represents a 
specific type of relationship that is empathetic rather than it being instrumental both in 
terms of domestic and foreign affairs, so as to diminish the impact of power in 
governing such interactions between rivaling groups and providing an environment 
that can be based on conflictual interests yet bonds are not severed. The theory of 
social constructivism is based on the influential works of Michael Mann, whose 
‘heresy’ as a sociologist rejecting the claim that society was a building block of the 
analysis of social power and instead ascribing it to the networks and social ties within 
the political and cultural spheres, that help us explain and understand official power 
structures, transcending the realm of sociology by admittance in other social sciences 
from politics to economics with notions of social capital at its essence (Snyder, 2006: 
306).   
 
The difficulty of describing constructivism in graphical depictions, as done previously 
with realism, owes to the idea of its anarchist origins with unregulated ties between 
different actors that is always dynamic and shifting and unlike realism does not have a 
well-defined course.  That is not to be mistakenly thought out to be, as most critics of 
the constructivist school label it, ‘a pie in the sky’ mode of analysis, for it too adheres 
to the same principle parameters of the cultural, political and economic boundaries, 
but provides an alternative understanding that is purposeful and instrumental for 
overcoming the realist’s dominance of power dynamics in their search for ‘true’ 
meaning as the ‘true guarantor of peace’ whom accordingly blame the happening of 
the Second World War on the ambivalence towards such harsh realities that could not 
forewarn them of the incoming threats and is also why to present date, the atomic 
bomb is considered the bringer of an end (Thies, 2002:173). Was diplomacy at that 
point of time so hopeless, that the only means to stop the war was to create so much 
devastation producing enough fear to conform the human race back to civility?   
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Figure 2(a) Illustration of Constructivism Figure 2(b)Graph of Constructivism 
 
 
It is these alternative routes that constructivists’ tend to territorially explore from a 
singular entity perspective, and not through static tracks, for figures 2(a) and (b) 
above are but models of what could be realized but can also diverge from the 
illustrations above. Conflict will probably always exist and could plausibly be 
indications of progress, yet conflict is not one singular barrier than we keep returning 
to, because of our political or cultural beliefs, they are numerous barriers that differ in 
shape, size and location over time, and relations between even any two rivals must be 
addressed from a collective viewpoint, as such constructivists in their analysis 
perceive both Israelis and Palestinians fate or destiny as one result and not that they 
both constitute the same thing, however they do not classify them according to who is 
powerful and focuses more on the choices of the people, as their interests and 
discontents are shared by a consequence of the moral norms that they abide to or 
reject within any given conflict. Figure 2(c) provides a 3D representation of the same 
phenomena as an aggregate of figures 2(a) and (b), showing the freedom of choices 
between the same two vertical barriers of action or cessation over time, however the 
relations to reach reconciliation, unlike in realism which is only describing the 
stationary inner happenings within our object in the diagrams with webs connecting to 
the boundaries, hence its spiral form, figure 2(c) shows that in constructivism they are 
not represented based on a strict formula of movement to overcome these diverse 
conflicts and do not include compromises as a kinetic force towards the end goal, 
instead it realizes that the object, in this case the Israeli and Palestinian people must 
make bilateral choices in the sense of shared norms if the object is to avoid colliding 
into various conflict barriers. 
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Figure 2(c) 3D Illustration of Constructivism 
 
 
 
 
 
The preference in analysis for this paper given to constructivism over realism, as a 
means to achieving peace, is not supposed to de-legitimize one tradition over another 
as in classic research, since as mentioned previously, constructivism borrows heavily 
from both realist and the idealist school. But again it is to provide alternatives to 
dominant academic practices within political science and attempt to reframe the 
conflict between Hamas and Israel, from simplistic binaries to more complex ones in 
the form of conflict and peace through cultural interpretations, to derive how should 
Hamas act for the Gazans, based on ideals that come about through the ‘ought’ rather 
than a fixation on the ‘is’ and ‘was’ of events that are engraved in power relations 
dictating their respective ideologies. 
 
‘Free society from the strengthening hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our 
ancestors freed us from the strengthening hold of the one true religion.’ (Feyerabend in 
Chalmers, 2004:156) 
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Chapter Two: Ideology and Hamas: A 
Genesis or Necrosis for Humankind? 
 
 
 
Previewing the Sources of Ideological Power 
 
 
The basis on which ideology is defined throughout, is based on the stance of Michael 
Mann’s writing on the anatomy of power that derives three main sources for effective 
ideologies: control over ‘Meaning, Morals and Rituals’ (Snyder, 2006:308).  These 
three absolute terms were refined by Mann to accommodate derivations made from 
other scholars and starting with Weber, where he believed that ‘meanings’ present not 
only the determinant of which path to take and can be pursued, but furthers the idea 
that an effective ideology along with economics, military and politics can act through 
networks and relations in society to create new directions for collective action, 
whereas Weber only defines it from the standpoint of a ‘switchman’ that has only to 
choose from channels presented to him, however, both scholars agree upon the 
fundamentals of what the term means as it is not just a descriptive word to be used to 
express understanding, but also is the premise of action, which is why ‘concepts and 
categories of meaning’ are ‘necessary  to social life’ and are procured from ‘social 
organization’ and not merely deduced from perception only, atoning for purposeful 
relations of man with nature, society, transition and most importantly legitimate 
authority, through those who control it yielding the distribution of its benefits and the 
ability to mobilize collective action (Snyder, 2006: 308). 
 
Morals, according to Mann’s drawn out arguments of Durkheim represents the 
common norms which regulate the behavior of people together through an 
understanding of acceptable shared actions; in that sense they become equally as vital 
to the success of any form of social network as it provides a sustainable set of 
relations based on trust and the morale of the people, which can also be accrued 
through institutionalism (Snyder, 2006: 308).  Beyond that Mann offers his 
contributions by adding that ideology does not only blend and reflect on the rules 
already governing any society, but could work as a catalyst for shifts creating new 
moral standards based on religious or cultural driven communities pertaining to the 
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social needs and desires they hope to achieve and is encompassed in the third source 
of ideological power embodied in ritual aesthetics, making doctrinal practice a 
commanding principle to collective action and distribution and through its repetition, 
becomes extremely hard to deny or even rationalize (Snyder, 2006: 308). 
 
Snyder (2006) makes a coherent augmentation of Mann’s three sources of power 
under the dichotomy of an “is’ and ‘ought’, where he ascribes to ultimate meaning a 
‘transcendental is’ which goes beyond the empirical ‘is’, or the ethical ‘ought’ 
constituting the core idea behind morality, and finally ritual presents the actions of 
both ultimate meaning and morality through concrete actions that display the two 
dimensions.  Augmenting all three elements depict what Snyder and Mann call a 
‘social reality’, however it becomes obvious the limitations of constructivist logic in 
this framework to verify empirical descriptions of the world we live in, but as Mann 
argues, ideology’s sole purpose is not just to do so, but is a means to re-forge our 
realities to succumb to and fit the appropriate description of the world we find 
favorable, however, that is not to say that ideology does not describe the world but it 
works as a mixture of both, as ideological power does not come from content ‘ but 
because of the way they go about answering basic questions of meaning and the 
consequences that this has for organizational potential’ (Snyder, 2006:309). In this 
sense the answers that ideology provide us seem temporarily absolute even though 
they are overripe with contradictions, they do so through their potential singular 
explanation and addressing of social problems and the contradictions inherent within 
networks of people especially when marginalized by incumbent powerful institutions, 
by doing so they manage to gain enough credibility to be followed (Snyder, 
2006:309).  This is not to say that ideology’s intentions are malice, on the contrary, 
they frame social relations and can be a motive for a unity between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic institutions in finding middle grounds in which a symbiotic 
relation can be found.  The rise of Hamas is evidently a particular example of such 
effective ideology. 
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Historic Overhaul in Palestinian Political Society  
 
 
Hamas’s creation dates at the start of the 1987 Intifada1, but the unraveling of the 
movement predates its creation and starts with the access to Israeli labor markets that 
increased per capita income and mobility after the occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza in 1967 making a profound impact on traditional bonds, rendering them weaker 
(Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 126). The outcome lead to new leaders to come to the 
foreground of politics other than municipal leadership, a class that was bound to the 
secular nationalist claims of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
simultaneously paralleling the new class of political elite was a group of counter 
hegemonic elite, the so-called traditional elite, who found the PLO’s dispositions 
narrow and more importantly found inspiration in the region-wide popularity of 
Islamism (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 126).  The counter-elite group consisted of 
conservative members, non-affiliated to the PLO from the refugee community and 
lower and middle class urbanites but specifically the poor desiring social equity and 
meritocracy as a binary opposite to what they saw as a graft-oriented PLO guided by 
nepotism and corruption (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 126).  Also well known is the 
historic support for the Hamas movement at its early stages by the State of Israel, as 
Chehab (2007: 20) accounts the questioning of Late Yitzhak Rabin by other members 
in the Knesset2 for his roles in supporting and even funding their activities which he 
responds too as a strategic choice ‘to undermine the influence of the PLO’ at the time, 
and has become common knowledge for those interested in the conflict as Joffe 
(2005) reaffirms. 
 
The 1970s and 1980s as populations exponentially grew and financial resources 
became readily available with the sharp rise and support of oil-rich Arab states came 
the newfound educated traditional elite, discontent with the lack of opportunities and 
unable to attain their expectations, that the first intifada was promulgated by them and 
under the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories (Gunning 
in Heiberg, 2007: 126). Henceforth came the genesis of a new resistance wing of 
youths; Hamas and their highly controversial 1988 charter which declared goals that 
                                                
1 The people’s revolt 
2 legislative assembly for the State of Israel 
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reflected not only the harsh environment that they were brought up in, but also the 
socioeconomic background of the social base and ideological inheritance of social 
morality based on the opposition of PLO elite and as a revamped adopter of political 
Islam from their predecessors the Muslim Brotherhood (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 
126). Yet even the controversial 1988 charter is not Koran3, as Mohammed Ghazal a 
Hamas leader is quoted saying, when discussing ‘reality’ and the political solutions 
that have transpired with time in these real relations (Siegman, 2006:3). The 
significant temporal effects are not only confined to changes in relations but also to 
ideology itself, which constitutes the sole purpose for movements to act and plays a 
significant role in the structuring and operationalization of most political institutions.  
 
The quest for answers on ideologies’ role and the emergence of ‘latent organizational 
potential’ is dependant on Mann’s four main factors: First, the availability of an 
infrastructure with a means of communicating to the people to exploit the existing 
contradictions present; Second, a supplier for the ideology, in this case Hamas 
presents itself more than just a manipulator but as an entrepreneur that provides 
information based on a motive; Third, comes the demand for the idea which must to 
some extent reproduce the concerns and interests of Gazan’s in order to mobilize their 
action, and finally the advantage and positive feedback derived through competition 
with the State of Israel and Palestinian rivaling party Fatah, paving the way for even 
more legitimacy and credibility leading to an expansion beyond that of mere ideology 
to the manifestation of an influential social network (Snyder, 2006:310). These 
fundamental concepts will be addressed respectively over the entirety of the paper but 
starting with a historical analysis of the structural conception of Hamas. 
 
 
Wings to Soar: The Structure of Hamas 
 
 
Hamas has three wings, the charities, political body and military ‘Qassam Brigades’; 
The charities are autonomous and if circumstances allow would be reviewed by their 
trustees and their elected executive board; The political wing is structured around 
regional councils, a national council and a political bureau, of which biennial 
                                                
3 Holy book of the Muslim faith considered to be the word of God and can never be 
edited. 
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elections results elect the decision makers, while both the national council and 
political bureau are comprised of internal leadership and those in exile (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007: 133).  Finally the military wing of Hamas is extremely decentralized 
so as to avoid detection, the relative autonomy of each cell within the wing is 
entrusted with the responsibility of being obedient rather than transparent, and to a 
lesser extent some of the cells are able to bypass the brigades hierarchy and consult 
leadership in exile, which further complicates matters and signals the contradictory 
claims regarding their operations, ever since the early 1990s (Gunning in Heiberg, 
2007: 133).  
 
Hamas leadership comprises of well-educated doctors, engineers and teachers, their 
primary support comes from the well educated lower and lower middle-income 
classes and especially those that their income was aggravated with the coming of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 129).  All three wings of 
Hamas gain their legitimacy from four intertwined sources of power, its well-
established network of philanthropic organizations with a highly respected reputation 
for financials and responsiveness and uplifting community’s interests, even though 
most of the charities have grown and become independent professionally, they remain 
under the overarching umbrella of Hamas as a political entity; where 80 to 90 percent 
of Hamas’s estimated annual budget generated through zakat4, remittances from the 
Palestinian diaspora, and international charities, is believed to be spent on social 
projects and not resistance activities (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 127/129). The 
second source has been their political activism, by dominating rallies, consultative 
councils and student unions in almost all the occupied territories. (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007: 127).  Thirdly, their resistance activities, not only in military terms, 
but the political leverage that augments it through the ability to foil negotiations and 
the tantamount prestige that comes from commoners in reflecting their popular belief 
that Hamas is ‘paying Israel back…in their own currency’ allows their military wing 
to operate with limited restraint and zero accountability (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 
128). Lastly, the valued position that Hamas has reached in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
cannot be dismissed at this point, for not only do they enjoy support for their 
resistance from the obvious choices of Iran, Syria and Lebanon, but also from Saudi 
                                                
4 Alms giving 
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Arabia for their Islamic principles and even secular governments such as Jordan as the 
late King Hussien, has on several occasions supported Hamas, by hosting their exiles, 
and in 1997, asking for the antidote for a poison used in the attempted assassination of 
the now political leader of Hamas , Khalid Mishal, and demanding the release of key 
figures in the organization. It is blatantly obvious that late king favored Hamas, not in 
support of their rigid initial charter or lack of ‘compromise’, a position that he clearly 
was one of the initial instigators of, but his personal preference to them over the PA 
and Fatah party (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 128).  The conglomerate of all four 
sources makes the PA in fact dependant on Hamas in regulating and administrating 
the Gaza territory to avoid a humanitarian crisis and reduces the chances of any clamp 
down, if necessary (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 128). Equally, it places Hamas in an 
awkward position as a newfound political party rather than a resistance movement, as 
the vast popular support it enjoys is no longer justifying practices of its military wing 
to go about without any assessment from a panoptical view of the global community, 
whose prime concern is the responsibility of this government towards its people 
demanding much more accountability and the obvious skepticism towards 
indoctrinating political Islam post 9/11. 
 
 
Square Rooting Ideology: A discourse on Islamism and 
its structural roots in Hamas 
 
 
The most provocative idea handled, is challenging the norm that the sweeping 
generalizations made on Islamism are not entirely correct and that there is a place in 
the global society for some Islamic movements, ever since the disastrous events of 
September 11th 2001.  Islamism as defined by the International Crisis Group (ICG, 
2005) is the manifestation of activism, under diverse hermeneutic religious 
interpretations on how to preserve this identity. In ‘Understanding Islamism’ they 
explain how in reaction to events on 9/11, Western observers and policy makers alike 
have branded all forms of Political Islam (read: Islamism) as hostile (ICG, 2005). 
Islamism is explained to have always had both internal and external bearings 
throughout history, but like most doctrines it too has multiple streams of 
understanding (ICG, 2005). There is no camera obscura here, the ideology behind 
Islamism is not trying to disguise its essential features, but the overall perception of a 
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uniform Islamism is distorting the perception of reality (Loomba, 2005). Broadly 
construed, with some generalizations, nowadays Islamism falls under three main 
categories; Political, Missionary and Jihadi, noting that the term jihadi here pertains 
to ‘holy warrior’ which is one of many types of jihad in Islam, not all insinuating 
warfare.  The Political is to challenge misgovernment and provide social justice.  This 
category of Islamism has evolved over the years, from armed struggles to accepting 
ideas of a nation-state, democracy, constitutional values and in some cases even 
equality between sexes, contrary to rituals of branding the religion as a cause of 
gender inequality and underdevelopment in the Arab/Muslim World through 
reductionism (Mohanty, 2003: 29); a form of reduction equivalent to that of 
stereotyping to reduce images into manageable forms (Loomba, 2005: 29). The 
Missionary agenda, otherwise known as ‘da’wa’ movement challenges the corrupted 
Muslim values and weakening of faith, to preserve an Islamic identity, their intentions 
are not political but cultural, in hope of increasing conversions simultaneously. 
Finally, the most wearisome form, Jihadist movements challenge non-Muslim ideals, 
politically and militarily through armed conflict in three different spheres; internally, 
globally and the irredentist who are claiming back occupied land, roots of which can 
be associated with the wars in Afghanistan in 1979 or more recent events in Lebanon 
and the Palestinian territories, as such they move between both national and global 
scenes (ICG, 2005). An offshoot of Jihadist movements and also an integral part of its 
origins is ‘Salafiya’ or Wahabism that is scholarly and enshrined in punitive action 
also against so called ‘Bad Muslims’ and are often referred to as ‘fundamentalists’ 
that are hostile to democracy (ICG, 2004). 
 
A negotiation on whether Islam and democracy are compatible is a widely debated 
topic in our current scholarly paradigm for its significance in the political assessments 
of contested popular parties in the Arab and Muslim world such as Hamas, as 
irredentist movements that have managed to shift their focal point from that to a 
significant political actor on a national stage. Thus, the burden of proof falls on 
Hamas, which has taken it upon itself to be both political and jihadi at the same time, 
to choose which form of Islamism it would follow if it is to be considered a 
responsible actor for its people by conforming to the general consensus of morality 
that governments nowadays must be democratic and accountable institutions, Islamic 
or not.  Amir Taheri (2004) argues that Islam and democracy are incompatible and 
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uses a linguistic argument to further his conclusions by stating that there are no 
transliterations of words such as democracy or equality or even politics, but claiming 
that ‘democratiya’ was only introduced very recently in the Arabic language, as was 
the case with English, and also ‘sawiya’ for equality to mean steady or balanced and 
finally ‘seyasah’ for politics as to mean shepherding. What Taheri fails to recognize is 
that Arabic has other words that prescribe the same meaning and are even more 
relevant to the question he poses.  For example, democratic leadership is embedded in 
the word hokm, to lead; from its derivatives you get hikma, meaning wisdom, 
mohakama to mean accountability and mahkama to mean judicial adjudication. To be 
a leader, in the arabic sense of the word and augmented with the main principle of 
Islamic polity shurra meaning consultation or as a verb ohkom, referee, is to be 
democratic in the Greek meaning of equality in isos.  Secondly, equality, while 
loosely based on sawiya as the author suggests, it is rather sawy, and its derivative 
mosawah is the act of equality, the word attains its meaning not from its form but its 
application.  Finally, Taheri, makes an accurate interpretation of seyasah for politics, 
which comes from shepherding, but also notable is that the term too is quite 
contemporary, as not in one scripture or medieval Arab poetry do you come across 
such a word, instead the word hokm mentioned previously as an articulation of justice, 
refereeing, leading, accountability and acting upon these principles situated in 
equality, are the foundation for not just meaning for the word politics, but also the 
actions ascribed to it, the ‘political.’ 
 
What is generally being ignored is that more than 800 million Muslims live in 
democracies including two heads of states in Muslim countries have been women, 
Indonesia and Bangladesh (Khan, 2001). The main attributes used in explaining the 
global war on terror or militant jihadi political Islam has been that extremists, 
collectively to mean both extreme and moderate political Islamic movements, “hate 
our way of life, our freedom, democracy, and success” (Esposito, 2007). Esposito 
tries to annul such claims though a qualitative study in which the sample included 
respondents bearing both views of Islam bringing about some interesting findings 
such as the most spontaneous response of what they admire the most about the west 
being technology, value system including rule of law and fair political systems based 
on democracy, human rights, gender equality and so on, with extremists actually 
scoring significantly higher (50 – 35 percent respectively) in their belief that 
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democracy would  bring progress to the Arab/Muslim world and even more so, that it 
is extremists who are even more eager to have better relations with the West 
(Esposito, 2007). Showing that in our post-modern world ‘Diasporic Islam’ or what 
Peter Mandaville calls ‘Transnational Muslim Politics’ is no stranger to globalization, 
as there is a willingness to include their own identity with that of the global 
community, as he reiterates how during the days of Ibn Battutta or Ibn Khaldun, 14th 
Century Muslim Scholars, a Muslim globalization was present in which one person 
could travel between three continents and still be in a familiar culture (ICG, 2004). 
The roots of Islam in the practice of democracy and tolerance to other cultures is 
evident in Makdisi’s parallels of humanism and scholasticism in classical Islam and 
that of the Christian Latin West, by questioning the rise of humanism in Italy rather 
than the superior literary of France. Quoting Jacob Burchkardt and his explanation 
that an Italian Mohammedan ideal of nobleness, dignity and pride are the origins of 
the Italian Renaissance (Makdisi, 1992). However, this preposition is being 
challenged in academia with rivalries in thoughts encouraging the divide between 
scholars such as Edward Said and their opponents such as Martin Kramer who 
critique these allegedly post-modern ideas as ‘misguiding the intellectual slaves’ by 
performing a revision of history (Owen, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, Weber, Nietzsche and Hegel all are quoted to have said that Islam is the 
most practical, rational and realistic of all religions.  The problem commences from it 
being realistic which is why violence at certain times can be condoned in self defense, 
but that does not equate the religion promoting such acts, but shows the struggle 
within the religion between constructivist/idealist and realist beliefs in that two verses 
from the Koran send very different messages to the worshipers of Islam making the 
matter open to subjective interpretations (Khan, 2001). The following are the two 
verses that are not hierarchically organized and a person may choose between, in their 
quest for meanings at times of crisis or conflict: 
 
And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places from where they 
drove you out, for persecution is worse than killing.  (Koran 2:191) 
 
 
Tell those who disbelieve that if they cease persecution of believers that which is past will be 
forgiven them. (Koran 8:38) 
 
 
  
 27 
Omnipresent is that those who choose militant means of resolving conflicts are 
reverting to the first verse mentioned above, but the one thing that Islam as a religion 
is innocent of is terrorist activity that targets human civilians, and specifically those 
targeted by Hamas, even if the argumentation is that they inhabit an occupied land by 
banishing its indigenous people and have all received military training, as is usually 
said, that should never be used as an excuse for current trends, not even if in 
retaliation to the deaths of Palestinian children by the Israeli military, as the Koran 
says: 
  
He who has killed one innocent soul, it is as if he has killed all humanity. And he who has 
saved one soul, is as if he has saved all humanity. (Koran 5:32) 
 
 
While not as definitive as the Koran in Islamic tradition, the parables and teaching 
instructions of the prophet Muhammed, were clear in demonstrating the principles in 
Islam on War Ethics, which prohibits fighting against non-combatants within and 
beyond battlegrounds and those who do not wish to fight or have surrendered, as well 
as forbids the killing of women, children, the elderly, the handicapped, monks and 
clergy, anyone praying and prayer congregations, the sick and injured and not to 
follow deserters off the battlefield. Furthermore, it is inscribed that no animals be 
harmed, or plants excised, water or wells intoxicated or the deliberate destruction of 
homes be conducted, at which point the general strategies of war are clearly expressed 
and should not include acts of betrayal, treachery, excessive brute, the mutilation of 
the dead and one apocryphal command, to never attack at night (Sabiq, 1987:41-42). 
  
Even though the discussion on Islam presents a tangent to our political discussion and 
lacks versed knowledge (read: Koranic) on the discourse on war ethics in Islam, or 
Islam in general, the normative understanding of what purpose religion plays in our 
lives would never accept estranged practices by Hamas in reality as doctrine, if our 
objective grounds for a ‘transcendental is’ can provide Hamas with meaning for their 
ideology. Furthermore, it complicates matters as the differentiation between jihadist 
organizations around the world confuses the perception of what is to be considered 
terrorism and what is not. Terrorism is generally defined as ‘a method, namely, 
politically motivated violence that deliberately targets civilians, or to be more precise, 
noncombatants’ (Heiberg, 2007: 6). War as an institution has always been associated 
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with the state, yet in our post-modern world it has become so decentralized and based 
on ‘identity politics’ making it so much harder to disassociate the activities of Hamas 
from everything happening in Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other war where Muslims 
are involved, ‘ a period of terminal decay’ of war, making conflict seemingly become 
primordial (Latham, 2002:259). The similarities between al-Qaida and Hamas should 
not be ignored and have branded Hamas as a terrorist organization, with Shimon 
Peres calling Salah Shehada the head of the Hamas’ military wing up until his 
assassination in 2002 a ‘local Osama Bin Laden’ (Chehab, 2007:70). However, these 
similarities should be open for discussion due to a limited definition of the word 
‘terrorism’ based on tactics with no reference to the context in which they take place, 
which could alternatively mean ‘freedom fighters’, and even though Hamas have 
relentlessly tried to differentiate themselves from al-Qaida as a spokesman for Hamas 
clearly points out that ‘Hamas believes that Islam is completely different [from] the 
ideology of Mr. al-Zawahiri’ (Siegman, 2006), yet the global community is yet to 
reach a decision on the matter as they rightfully remain weary of Hamas’ deliberate 
targeting of civilians as a form of negotiating for justice amongst other reservations 
made on their form of governance that is slowly being exposed as a regression to 
authoritarian rule for the Gaza population under the same pretence of the formation of 
an Islamic state and their political survival.  
 
 
 
Mysterious who’s who in what ideology? Hamas or al-Qaida? 
 
 
Whether these statements hold true in our analysis of Hamas is yet to be revealed, but 
for now we can conclude that what is being suggested is not simply for Hamas to 
shave their beards, put on a smile and act civil with everyone, feeding to the demands 
of a realist strategic choice, even though tragically this would actually work, but to 
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actually construct for themselves a new political image. One that can differentiate 
them as an irredentist Islamist movement from the more dogmatic forms of jihadist 
Islam and it starts by renouncing the use of violence to achieve their goals and gain 
the trust and much needed respect of the global community in their search for global 
political legitimacy by potently advocating for peaceful solutions rather than inciting 
hate, in order to obtain their people’s rights and benefits whom they are responsible 
for. 
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Chapter Three:  The Efficiency in 
Supplying Ideologies and Practicality of 
Hamas 
 
 
 
By now, the realization is that Islamism as an ideology is meant to serve multiple 
purposes and has varied meanings that depend on the situation that it is to be utilized 
for, so the question then becomes, how well has Hamas managed to effectively utilize 
their ideology locally as a supplier? Organization-centered ideological power or what 
Mann calls ‘Immanent’ ideologies tend to stagnate the status quo, as alternatives seem 
far fetched and the destitute conditions of people hinders any attempts to a 
‘transcendental’ ideology, this lack of imagination is currently what can be described 
as an embodiment of the situation in Gaza (Snyder, 2006:314).  What Hamas have 
ignored in their rise to power is that even the expansion of Islam was not solemnly 
based on armed conflict; the persuasion to conversion was actualized through literacy, 
law and ritual alike and not aggression or coercion (Snyder, 2006:314). 
 
From the institutional plane, persuasion according to Mann becomes a key 
mechanism on the supply side of ideology; the only crippling factor for its proper 
implementation is primarily the influence of private interests or material gain 
embedded within the tool which certainly shrinks the legitimacy of the network 
(Snyder, 2006:315).  Both Fatah and Hamas in the ventures for political survival have 
fallen victim of traps of persuasion, for differing reasons, while Fatah continues to 
enjoy legitimacy through acceptance in the world community, even though they share 
a similar history to that of Hamas, the constituency of Gaza are provoked by Fatah’s 
in-group mentality which has sidelined the interests of some. While on the other hand 
Hamas has locked in a rhetoric that comes from an emotional understanding of the 
conditions of their people, this form of persuasion is similar to both the developments 
occurring during the French revolution and the period of nationalistic pride.  In both 
periods the nationalistic claims had overridden any speech for tolerance, these claims 
did not end with the toppling of monarchies but continued after the circumstantial 
  
 31 
events, as the French people became locked in the rhetoric of treason, as do Hamas 
when prescribing dealings with Fatah in Gaza (Snyder, 2006:315). The particular 
shaping of identity on an ‘is’ situation is also what aided the emergence of 
nationalistic endeavors which primarily rule the people but have rarely been 
accountable to their people as Snyder (2006) suggests to be ‘the universal expedient 
of political elites’ this is usually formulated within this shift with the magnification of 
an external threat, in some cases the out-group in post revolution periods, thus 
ensuring the survival of the new political elite, which reflects the huge void between 
the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Snyder, 2006:316). Suggesting that Hamas’ in their acquisition 
of the reigns of government, furthered their political survival upon their resistance to 
Israeli occupation and role in de-legitimizing their political opponents, in skirmishes 
based on political differences that jeopardize people’s lives and as such cannot be 
ascribed to the moral ‘ought’ in what can only be described as Khalil Shaheen from 
the Palestinian Center for Human Rights says: 
  
‘They are playing with the lives of people and their pain. There's a complete absence of 
responsibility.’ (Hadid, 2009) 
 
 
Hamas and their objectives in trying to rule over Gaza, based on popular support, was 
not always so distant from a moral understanding, as the differences between the 
identity of Hamas and that of its political rivals the well renowned Muslim 
Brotherhood or Fatah depends on two main characteristics defining Hamas’ structure 
and parallels its political culture, which are consultation and pragmatism (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007: 134).  Again, to distinguish themselves from their political rivals, 
consultation with the population takes place in almost all vital political decisions such 
as participation in the 1996 elections, a practice that is to make sure that their 
legitimacy, as an organization remains enshrined in their social base of adamant 
followers, by doing so, consultation becomes the tool to increase their power wielding 
ability when in confrontation with Fatah, which happens to enjoy such privileges and 
has on several occasions taken that liberty for granted when considering the interests 
of all their constituents (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 135).   Hamas in their own right 
have managed to address their lack of power through what western society would call 
populist democracy, and their financial integrity only helps boost their claims of 
ideals of morality.  Hamas was not always arguably pragmatic in nature, if at all, but 
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various factors account for changes in ideology and momentum, foremost is their 
imprisonment that exposed them to many ideas of the leftist activists political sphere, 
that encouraged a pluralist understanding over an absolutist one (Gunning in Heiberg, 
2007: 135).  A second and important factor is the widening scope of their supporters 
that followed diverse interests, rendering them the main benefactor of alms and 
electoral support not for their stance on Israel, but the belief in their governance 
model embedded in their leadership skills and perceived integrity, Hamas as a 
counter-hegemonic organization lent itself clearly to the pragmatic politics evolving 
at the end of the first intifada, as no longer was it valid for the PA to be threatened by 
Marxists and Brother ideologies, as they attained their international recognition, thus 
eliminating any specters of opposition, Hamas in this pivotal political environment 
was able to establish itself away from the Brother’s condemning of leftist as ‘non-
believers’ and provide social cohesion for Palestinians to a large extent (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007: 136).   From their early conception in the 1990s, Hamas by 
imperatively seeking popular support for their political gain, embraced coalition 
building, building strong alliances with the so-called ‘unbelievers’ from the left 
(Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 137). 
 
Other factors that the author expresses to show the level of pragmatism within the 
Hamas lines, are according to the author manifested in the key leadership positions 
given to Ismail Haniyeh and the late Ismail Abu Shannab, both of which portray and 
vocalize the Palestinian people’s need to a ceasefire and have shown the willingness 
to compromise, If Hamas was not interested in such developments then more extreme 
views from within the organization would have held these positions (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007: 134).   Pragmatism in the Hamas cadres does not come from choice in 
fact it is necessary for their political survival, the charities that operate do not have the 
access to some of the political elites and need the pragmatic program to further their 
goals (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 135).  Furthermore, the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, 
was unable to rule autocratically as a charismatic spiritual leader for the movement 
because of his paraplegic condition, he was forced to depend on others, such as the 
well-educated charismatic leaders of the organization, Musa Abu Marzouk and Abd 
El-Aziz al-Rantisi, both of which enjoyed a lot of charisma, but because of their  
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education and professional careers were even more skeptical of autocratic regimes, 
which translated into their movement’s leadership style (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 
135). 
‘Hamas has begun a shift from an absolutist, reactionary resistance movement to a more 
pragmatic, politically oriented resistance organization, which, at least domestically, has 
become increasingly accommodationist.’ (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007: 123) 
 
 
This level of pragmatism that Gunning and other authors express has not always 
translated well within the field of international relations and especially with their 
politics towards Israel and the Western world, whether that is because of a realist read 
of the ontology of the ideology itself based on an ‘is’ partaken through unfolding 
events or a misconception that groups together all political Islamist movements or a 
precise interpretation of the epistemological hidden intentions of Hamas as an 
ideological representation of political Islam are all valid questions that must be 
addressed from two sets of relations that Hamas has, the one with the State of Israel 
and the second being with their people in Gaza, as prerequisites in the construction of 
a new paradigmatic peace oriented venture within their institution.   
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Chapter Four: Archaic International 
Relations – The Hamas and State of Israel 
Conflict 
 
 
 
 
Josef Joffe (2005) recounts events in the Middle East to try and see whether it is true 
that the State of Israel is the root cause of the conflict and whether the disappearance 
of the state would have any positive change to the Middle East and Muslim world in 
general. By accounting for the several intra Muslim conflicts including the longest 
conventional war between Iraq and Iran, Joffe concludes that what Arab/Muslim 
countries are blaming on the state of Israel, is nothing more than a diversion of the 
real intent of several prevailing ideologies in the region from Baathist to Khomeinist 
to Wahabist, and Hamas is no different for they too would not disband once Israel is 
gone, claiming that Hamas ‘has bigger ambitions than eliminating the “Zionist entity” 
the organization seeks nothing less than a unified Arab state under a regime of God.’ 
(Joffe, 2005) He further argues that Israel’s role in the region and its existence has 
curtailed some of the enmity between Arab states and even smaller parties hold 
against each other. The recent events that occurred in Palestinian territories reinforce 
his argument that the more land the Palestinians acquire the more violent the internal 
strife becomes. While Joffe (2005) makes a strong case against Hamas he too 
recognizes the gravity of Hamas as an organization and does not belittle the suffering 
of Palestinians people, but through his argumentation he fails to see that the fate of 
Palestine is attached to that of Israel and that it should be of equal concern for the 
Israelis, as much as the Arabs, that all neighboring conflicts be prevented if there is to 
be any peace in the region, and as such any confrontation and isolation of Hamas does 
not serve such purpose.  
 
The mossad5 are even quoted as saying, that Hamas constitutes a fifth of Palestinian 
society, that has political weight that cannot be ignored, and to wish that they 
disappear one day as an element that is central to their society would be a foolish 
undermining of their capabilities (Siegman, 2006:3).  But there is no denying that the 
                                                
5 Israeli National Intelligence Agency 
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use of violence by Hamas provides grounds for its inclusion as a ‘terrorist’ 
organization under the current political nebulas or to say the least an insurgency group 
that has long threatened the State of Israel and must be engaged one way or another, 
perhaps? An image that is conducive to the practices that the organization has adopted 
over the years and the sharp rise in military activity prior to the recent events that 
occurred in January 2009 culminating in a war in Gaza, which has had devastating 
repercussions on both populations. The question then becomes for how long will they 
persist or continue to jeopardize their constituency like that? And what is to be gained 
from such military action? Alternatively, we could ask why do some insurgencies last 
longer than others? Intellectual accounts on conflicts in several regions of the world 
between the 1970s and 1990s emerged shifting the core arguments to the resilient 
products of national, ethnic and religious categories. While some claimed that the 
rivalry was primordial others saw them as novelties. To others it was instrumented by 
the dwindling authority of elites, in this case Fatah, others viewed it as consequential 
to colonialism, imperialism, globalization and the leading theory entertained at the 
time, was the vacuum at the end of the cold war, that could only be substituted with 
‘political will’ of major powers.   
 
In all the significant scholarly studies, accounts followed real-world events (Heiberg, 
2007:9). Hamas as a case is not so different from many other movements that have 
taken shape in all corners of the world, except they remain in the lime light and part 
of one of the most spoken about conflicts of our time, they utilize what has been 
described as insurgency ‘a technology of military conflict characterized by small, 
lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas.” favorable in 
societies with weak states and political instability, rough terrain, but predominantly 
because of poverty, all indicators mentioned can be attributed to the predominance of 
Hamas and rejection of accords held between the PA and Israel (Heiberg, 2007:11). 
The main reason for Hamas’ refusal of taking part in the Oslo agreement is that they 
perceive it as autonomy and not sovereignty, under which Israeli can impose a limited 
self-government for the people of the land (MEPC, 2002). Furthermore, Hamas 
refrain from recognizing Israel as they claim to not know where the boundaries of 
Israel start and end, meaning is what being proposed as the land of Israel, the UN 
declared 1947 borders, or pre-1967 border or does it entail fifty percent of the West 
Bank as indications show, Hamas remain skeptical of what the Israeli intentions are 
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when defining the physical boundaries of the conflict over land and are not fully 
against the premise of peace, but in details that have never been transcribed (Siegman, 
2006:5). 
 
What the State of Israel fears from a two-state solution devised with Hamas is the 
advocacy for an Islamic state, yet this seems to be more of a political and 
socioeconomic choice than a religious one, it is how their identity can stay exclusive 
and different by representing a substitute paradigm for the relentlessly sterile/secular 
government championed by Fatah, according to Palestinian opinion (Gunning in 
Heiberg, 2007:130). Also, the Islamic state that Hamas envisions is ironically one that 
does not adhere to the teachings of Islam and the concept of Umma, which does not 
rely on any nationalistic components within the Islamic state in the grouping of 
people but on religious affiliations instead. What this shows is that the responsive 
context-sensitivity of their position is always changing and given the right political 
environment, Hamas would not hesitate to marry their Islamist identity with an 
inherently exhibited secular logic. Abu Shanab, former Hamas leader, reiterates such 
claims in one of his interviews that the demographic outnumbering of Arabs in the 
region is not necessarily a threat to Jews for as much a right that Arabs have to live as 
Muslims so should the Jews and that the main problem with the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict is the persistence of association within religious groupings with disregard to 
treating both people as humans as the foremost principle of relations, which can 
ultimately lead to the solution of the crisis (MEPC, 2002).  
 
The total liberation of Palestine is but rhetoric that is equally contextually situated, for 
the unraveling of events occurring portray the willingness to become part of a 
political framework and as such ‘not as absolute as its absolutist rhetoric.’  
Furthermore, the resorting to violence by Hamas only started in 1994, early after the 
1993 Oslo accords, again this is contextual, and is not reflective of relations with 
Israel but the internal strife with the PA and lack of achievements towards 
commitments which widened the income gap between the in-group and out-group or 
counter hegemonic elite (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:130).  But the entirety of the 
situation shows more than just internal struggles as being catalytic to the initiation of 
violence by Hamas, as this turning point reveals one of the first moments of fallout 
between the late Sheik Yassin and Yasser Arafat, whom had been dear friends over 
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the years and were a united front, since the peace deals, according to Sheikh Yassin, 
disregarded the rights of return for refugees, lacked definitive borders and the quest 
for a capital in East Jerusalem, which were all blinded by the then Koranic 
interpretation of Sheikh Yassin that the Israeli state had but only 28 years to go until 
their downfall, because of his alleged correlation between the story of Moses and his 
people being lost in the desert and that of current political situation in Israel (Chehab, 
2007:104). Beyond stating whether these demands are rightful or not, or whether they 
were strategically impressionable to foil the peace deal and gain popularity as a 
resistance movement, this position and belief never remained static as the relation 
between armed attacks and support for the peace process, soon after, as illustrated in a 
December 1996 CPRS poll underlies an inverted relationship:  
 
 
Figure 3. Support for negotiation and armed attacks among Palestinians, 1994-1995. Based on CPRS 
Polls, Nos. 12, 15, 16. 
 
 
(Source: Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:131) 
 
 
Yet proof exists that not all radical methods and resistance operations are a 
consequences of Hamas’ lack of compromise, but also in retaliation to targeted 
assassinations, and notably that not all the operations were authorized by Hamas 
leadership as ‘spoilers’ (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:130). Some were aimed to deter 
Israeli killing of Palestinian civilians as Zahar a Hamas leader is quoted as saying 
(MECP, 2002). Notably, the consequence was the tainting and distortion of their 
image as in 1996, the Likud party were able to come to power lead by Binyamin 
Netenyahu, over the less popular Shimon Peres at the time, a failed move that not 
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only shows some of Hamas’ political naivety at the time but had an adverse effect on 
the declared intentions of Hamas to shift the balance of power and reach a truce 
instead resulting in a shift in mainstream Israeli opinion with injected manifestations 
in Israeli people voting for a conservative right wing government during elections 
(Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:130).  It is not until years later, when Hamas is elected, 
that reflecting on this incident would instigate some regret for the loss of lives.   
 
The manifesto that outlines Hamas’ strategy on the outset of coming to power reflects 
a willingness to open up the political spectrum for all factions and even though what 
is documented is not so far from the objectives of the PA or Fatah in accepting a two 
state solution, the renouncing of their right to resistance was never transcribed, 
providing Israel with more doubts and interpreted as a consideration of Hamas to keep 
the struggle open for future generations as one senior official says ‘you will never 
find anyone in Hamas who will recognize Israel’s right to exist. If you do, he is a liar’ 
(Chehab, 2007:203). Correlation made to the past on such particular events broaden 
and stalemate the conflict at the same time as an archival interview with Sheikh 
Yassin’s states that he accepts the 1967 borders as only a stage in the struggle for 
independence and not a definitive solution to the plight of his people, but in the same 
breath continues by saying that he envisions a one-state solution, a land in which 
Muslims, Christians and Jews can have equal rights, but when asked if this should 
occur under an Islamic state Sheikh Yassin assumes the role of democracy in 
choosing such matters as has happened in countries like the United States of America 
(MECP, 2002).  
 
Hamas’ praise of the United States of America and its important role to bring about a 
cessation for hostilities is one thing that has haunted Hamas as an organization in 
recent years since 9/11, as Hamas believes fully that the unparalleled support of 
Israel, is in one part slowing down the peace process, yet acknowledges that only if a 
shift in US foreign policy happens as it did during the years of Eisenhower and his 
stiff letter to Ben Gurion calling for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of Sinai, 
an event that Hamas interprets as a prerequisite for a forceful withdrawal of Israeli 
troops, essentially needs a U.S president with moral fiber (MECP, 2002). This 
recognition of US intervention unfolds to show that Hamas and the PA are trying to 
be part of a larger global community and are aiming at appeasing the global identity 
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yet have equally both imagined international relations under the culture of political 
realism, thus shifting the burden of achieving peace to negotiating with the 
superpower and shying from the imperative need to also calmly negotiate with Israel 
as part of a ‘transcendental is’ administered through the a moral conduct brought 
about by an ‘ought’ that it is Israel that are their neighbors and not the US.     That is 
not to suggest that Israel has played any constructive role too in reconciling the 
complex and somewhat mixed differences, as deterrence becomes the underlining 
common denominator for all political strategy when it comes to this conflict as Jabr 
Wishab, the deputy director of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, explains that 
the purpose of the recent Israeli attack on Gaza in early 2009 was a collective 
punishment tactic to enforce a deterrent against the re-election of Hamas in 
Palestinian territories to curtail their popularity as well as to demonstrate that Israel 
does not accept the 2006 election results and has already chosen the partner for peace 
talks, regardless of people’s choices (Wright, 2009).  The disadvantages of a strategy 
of isolation being imposed, as proposed by General Shlomo Brom from the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF), is that the Palestinian population will always blame Israel and 
the West for their elected government Hamas being marginalized if it is unable to 
perform its duties and concludes that a strategy of engagement remains in Israel’s best 
interest for the alternative would evidently fail under these special circumstances 
(Siegman, 2006:7). 
 
The deterrent capabilities of both players displays a culture of political realism that 
dictates their strategies in terms that magnify the private interest of each party with no 
considerations for a collective understanding of equally desired goals to end a conflict 
that is inflicting harm on citizens of both camps.  Through this a personalization of 
the conflict emerges by facing off the State of Israel against Hamas as the agents of 
negotiation rather than a favorable representation of the aspirations of both people. 
Evidence of such misplaced judgments have been discussed in Hamas’ overall 
potential as a ‘spoiler’ in previous chapters, but has proven to be shifting to a more 
limited form ever since they came to power, yet Hamas’ ‘Real Politick’ with regards 
to policy seems to be continuing to be primarily determined by calculations that are 
strategic in nature (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:131). Since they are aware that 
‘security is the one commodity that Israel desires and the Palestinians can withhold’ 
(Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:132). From Hamas’ perspective it is Israel that is stalling 
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the peace process and as such is the ‘spoiler’; no trust between the rivals therefore no 
will or commitment for peace. Statements made by Dr. Abd Al-Aziz Al Rantisi 
conform to the perception of Hamas that they are given no other political choices with 
daily humiliations and aggression overwhelming their choice for struggle and 
freedom (MEPC, 2002). Abu Shanab, also delivers on the same notion by contesting 
the seven years of negotiations with the Israeli government, which in his view, 
Palestinian needs and rights have been tossed around due to Israeli’s superior military 
strength which it tries to use as leverage to dictate the terms of peace with the PA 
(MEPC, 2002).  Another significant shortcoming of political realism that envisions 
relations within a conflict based on power, but alternatives to such parasitic 
associations do exist within the realm of engagement.  
 
Marc Lynch (2002) categorizes both realist and constructivist traditions within the 
typologies of engagement by consummating strategic engagement to the realist 
agenda while the communicative engagement is assigned to constructivist theories.  
He defines strategic engagement as a logic of action that is instigated through a threat 
and incentive program that brings one set of actors to align with the preferences of 
another by attempting to manipulate behaviors with slight compromises made on both 
sides, thus the initiator’s policies are driven by targeting the receptor more as an 
object rather than an equal partner (Lynch, 2002:203). Several examples of such 
practices have been widely applied to peace programs and relations, while the author 
concentrates on the China-US relation, so to can the relations with the former Soviet 
Union and Russia be thought of in a similar fashion.  These bonds although 
entrenched in mutual respect exhibit a very limited form of peace, a civilized one 
nonetheless, but the crucial misstep is in assuming that the targeted state, depending 
on which side of the fence you look at it, is unaware of the changes requested or 
imposed under the carrot-stick thematic, which when works means either 
idealistically, is a desirable objective, or commonly a carefully calculated ability to 
change or in rare occasions is simply plain ignorance (Lynch, 2002:203).  The 
compromises made here are subsequent to level of commitment and distribution of 
power, where the weaker state needs to show conformity, and the stronger state less 
so in terms of compromise (Lynch, 2002:204).   
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Alternatively, communicative engagement presents a seriousness and awareness of 
both actors in dialogue of reaching a consensus through reasoning and argumentation 
that is in the best interest of both parties instead of one that is based on preconceived 
interests, thus understanding follows from an empathetic relation of each others 
claims and not based on coercion or manipulation, where ideally self interests can be 
bracketed (Lynch, 2002:204). The communicative model is supposed to champion 
consensus over compromise and should not be a persuasive attempt through rhetoric 
to alter one’s arguments or appeal to the normative, but to create a new shared set of 
norms that can be viewed legitimately from both sides, as rare as this ideal is in 
practice it should not be dismissed as an instrumental end for such a valiant goal 
(Lynch, 2002:204). By doing so, an alteration of the perceptions within each 
community of the right to land must be changed if bonds of trust are to forge, 
Palestinians and not just Hamas, need to accept that Israelis have every right to 
inhabit these lands away from historic beliefs of the land being under Arab or Muslim 
rule or the rhetoric of it being waqf6 land.  While on the other hand, the Israeli and not 
just their state must acknowledge the rights of Palestinians to co-exist and that their 
interests are equally as significant in negotiations and that having a more powerful 
position does not necessarily mean that they can and will bow to the demands of the 
more superior military machine. Ideally, the best-shared norm would be to have a 
culture that believes in a one-state solution, however the viability of such a paradigm 
is extinguished by the Israeli aspiration to found a Jewish state as does Hamas 
arguably hope for with their Islamic state propaganda, both of which belong to the 
respective persistent private identities.   
 
Both sides rely on their religious identity to further their politicized ideological 
stagnation which has to date only generated more settlement building, suicide 
bombing, civilian shelling and backward religious fundamentalism. From another 
perspective communicative engagement could also have a destructive element to it, as 
through intensive dialogue suspicions could arise of the intentions of actors as they 
realize what is at stake or the ‘depth of disagreement’ that might possibly inflame 
incidents, but that does not mean that communicative models are the proprietors of 
such damage but more of a consequence to a lack of trust that builds such hostilities 
                                                
6 Islamic law of endowment of property owned by God to be managed by generations 
of Muslims and non other.  
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and lack of shared norms (Lynch, 2002:207). This is necessary to understand why 
most negotiations to date have failed between the two rivaling ideologies 
Islamism/Zionism and also between the State of Israel and Hamas as political actors, 
but also as maintained in constructivist tradition the deep-rooted identities of 
Palestinians and Israelis alike which draw a better map of what is expected from a 
peaceful resolution rather than political parties that are only temporarily the agents of 
change.   
 
Lynch follows through his arguments for a shift towards communicative engagement 
by demonstrating the viability of reading and changing preferences in search of a 
stable order of relations by first and foremost proposing the need for a transparent and 
contesting public sphere for reading preferences which would constrain the state’s 
potential of strategic maneuvering (Lynch, 2002:211). However reading preferences 
is a somewhat ambiguous and as mentioned difficult task within conflicts, making it 
important to change preferences. Rationalists and realists in strategic engagement 
hold preferences as constant that need compromise to change as a solution, while 
interaction is the basis for the communicative proposition on three main points, that 
these preferences are open to discussion, and that the changes do not impose a regime 
change and entails more than strategy and change of behavior but socialization 
(Lynch, 2002:212). Hamas as a ‘limited spoiler’ has obviously had to accept these 
changes in a wake of compromise and not stemming from belief, so that their position 
is not to regain all the land they see as rightfully theirs, as the late Abu Shanab 
realized the inability of the rhetoric of Israel’s destruction from taking place and 
championed a ceasefire (Chehab, 2007:111).  
 
This factionalism within Hamas is not only compounded on personal views but also in 
Rantisi’s statements that show that even the rhetoric of Hamas is what it is supposed 
to be, only rhetoric, where in an interview he states that ‘ as for the destruction of 
Israel, we haven’t the strength. So to speak as though we did is not at all logical’ 
(MEPC, 2002). With that in mind, both populations must reach the conclusion that 
they are both destined to one fate as non will cease to exist whether the militaristic 
struggle continues or not, so what their actions are proposing is just prolonging the 
people’s entitlement to a peaceful settlement in the region.  The equivalent of what we 
see today between European countries and specifically the peaceful relations with 
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Germany, a country that not so long ago was deemed an evil nation, bent on the 
destruction of our global shared norms.  Within the act of persuasion, players must 
consciously agree to contemporary beliefs not by means of compromise but a 
preference of cooperation that does not assume away the conflict of interest but 
transforms the conflict away from identity politics and dogmatic beliefs whether they 
be national or religious to ones based on interest alone (Lynch, 2002:214).  The 
socialization process should not extend a status quo of relational types but 
deliberately manifest itself in institutions that are accepted by both sides (Lynch, 
2002:217). Tracing back to the hypothesis of Germany becoming one of the most 
fond of nations within the European union was tested on a sample of SOLIYA 
facilitators, the results that came are as follows: 
 
Table. 1(a) : SOLIYA facilitator’s responses to poll on Cultural attitudes in Europe 
  
Nationality Gender As a National Of Britain/France/Germany, which of the other 
two nationalities do you have a more positive cultural attitude 
towards? 
German M B 
German F F 
American M G 
American M B 
American/ 
Australian 
F G 
American F G 
French/ American F G 
American F B 
French M G 
French F G 
French F G 
German F F 
 
 
The results although marginal in terms of numbers show that out of a group of 30 
peace and conflict mediating practitioners, most respondents do prefer Germany 
nowadays than the other two nations. What was even more surprising is that even 
though American’s responses are to be considered errors, yet they yield the same 
result contrary to anticipated results based on the political belief that the US and 
Britain have stronger ties.  These results are in no way definitive or accurate, but only 
an indication that change in cultural attitudes is not such a far fetched ideal, but as 
‘real’ if not more than ‘real’ political affiliations between nations. We would suppose 
that after the Second World War that the French would appreciate the British more 
and overcome their historic rivalry based on an alliance against an aggressor, which 
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was made not so long ago, however, the newfound bonds between Germany and 
France prove otherwise from a culturally constructed perspective within this sample.  
Which evidently means that ‘real’ peace is not a bi-product of political negotiation 
and affiliation, bearing its fruits in relations between USSR and China with the US 
but is actually brought about by self-reflexive nations that realize their deviance from 
the moral ‘ought’ and seek to create new ties based on a ‘transcendental is’ that 
accepts events as moments of the past, but ensure that progress is not based solemnly 
upon them, to allow for change, recreation and a re-imagination of relations. 
 
Compromise is not the only viable solution through peace talks, for within the 
tradition of constructivism, if both parties are willing to accept each others interests 
even if they do not agree with the boundaries, then it is more of a mutual 
understanding that is needed rather than compromise.  Establishing peace between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis is not based on power dynamic’s simple reconfiguration 
of lines on maps, but the understanding with no compromise the rights of both people 
in their respective states not only to land, but resources, respect for holy sites and the 
integral disposition of dignity, which is why Tanya Rienhart (2005) believes the 
Camp David negotiations were a mere strategic manipulation attempt by Ehud Barak 
to re-interpret UN resolutions 181, 242 and 338, contrary to beliefs of generous 
offerings, to provide the Palestinians with an undignified settlement that imprisons 
them in four separated enclaves on 60 percent only of the 1967 West Bank with no 
acknowledgment of the question of refugees, which she proposes would be the least 
requirement of the Israeli state to attempt to move closer to an end of the conflict, as it 
no longer poses any real threat for the Jewish state, but would imply a genuine 
attempt to reconcile the differences among the two people. (Rienhart, 2005: 42-60) 
Political realism defines conflict in such rigid terms that restrict the people from 
imagining different societies, ones in which the track choices, are not obtained from 
what can be understood as feasible under the current ‘real’ conditions but rather 
allows for the formulation of new tracks that enable a conducive environment based 
on morality. 
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Chapter Five: Hamas and Governance, 
Relations with Constituency and Rivals 
 
 
 
Zeal is not the ‘God of War’ 
 
 
Religious identities were not always perceived with such negative connotations and 
did not become predominant for their advocacy of intolerance against other social 
groupings. Mann’s first arguments made on the role of ideology in track laying or 
track following, helps examine the structural potential of ideology from two 
dimensions, its existent social networks and ties prior to the qualitative leap in the 
ideology itself through a vessel or medium of dissemination and the contradictions 
that diminish the power of authority in existing monopolies (Snyder, 2006:310).  
Mann’s thesis on the analysis of ideology based on social constructivism revolves 
around what he calls ‘spurs’ in social power that take place in networks going beyond 
existing ones, as religious ideologies have done in the past tapping into and 
unleashing ‘the qualitative leap’ in cooperation between these various networks to 
their mutual benefit (Snyder, 2006:307).  
 
The cases that Mann present are Islam and Christianity, as Islam worked as a 
tracklayer, setting down a pattern of social organization that managed to integrate 
feuding tribes that were incommensurable societies, solving disparages in collective 
action that bid the Arabian tribes against each other and especially the affluent trading 
families in Mecca, made reciprocal practices based on belief rather than kinship; 
Islam created a new moral standard by applying the simplistic yet much needed 
reform of equality and rigorous ritual to indoctrinate the new code of conduct between 
the Arabian tribes prior to its expansion (Snyder, 2006:311).  Christianity on the other 
hand , exposed and purposefully utilized the contradictions within the networks of the 
Roman empire and within the Jewish community and in that sense became a track-
shifter as society in Roman times was riddled with universalistic versus regional ties, 
hierarchy versus equality, centralization versus local governance and the use of 
military or civility; All this happened within the framework of a civilization that was 
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already burdened with the failure of imposing uniformity in culture and accepting 
multiculturalism; the utility of which provides empirical evidence of collectivity in a 
new culture that would be void of ethnic ties over a vast region, as Christians did not 
materially gain from being part of the in-group but significantly managed to survive 
famine because of the collectivity enshrined in their religion over that of the pagans’ 
(Snyder, 2006:312).  
 
What both examples of the founding of Islam and Christianity show is that the 
empirical demonstration of the ‘is’ allowed for the validity of the ethical ‘ought’ for 
social utility, as political Islam nowadays fills the gap of deficient public services, 
Hamas evidently prove that point with their community programs, but just like 
salvation religions, their lack of sustainability lies within its interaction over time, 
with outsiders and the coming to power, as did Christianity in recognizing the much 
needed relations with the so-called barbarians, so instead of civil communication, 
militaristic tendencies plagued their society shifting the power and authority from 
their initially established moral code to that of the realm of military dominance 
(Snyder, 2006:313).  In that sense, Hamas is only acting as a track-shifter as is unable 
to produce a different path for their people’s afflictions. Reservations made on the 
structuring of Hamas and contradictory ideological claims do not end with the 
apparent hostility towards the Israeli state but have also caused a rift within the 
organizations core, a schism that exists within its framework, as leaders of the 
military wing left to join the PA security apparatus namely Abdul Fattah Al Satari, 
Kamal Khalifa and three other highly recognized figures, because of repeated internal 
assassination threats and lack of communication with the political wing, reflective of 
an impairment within the armed struggle movement (Chehab, 2007:110). 
 
The questions that arise from the demonstration effects of an ‘is’ tends to provide an 
answer to why do Gazans continue to follow Hamas and their ideology in general?  
Mann presents four plausible solutions to our dilemma, Ideology becomes effective if 
the propagators control all means of dissemination and persuasion and thus are 
exemplary of an immanent ideology which can only sustain itself as long as no 
decentralization of control mechanisms such as Media, Education and in the case of 
Gaza even weaponry to fend for dignity, do not flow to society, the only shortcoming 
of this answer is that supply alone cannot justify the demand for ideology (Snyder, 
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2006:316). Furthermore, this form of totalitarianism is implicated beyond the 
acquisition of the ideological expansion and is no longer consistent with what is 
considered morally acceptable.  The recent events documented by Amnesty 
International show an alarming change within the tactics of Hamas to remain in 
power, as during the recent war on Gaza, a campaign of violence was initiated against 
Fatah supporters, Hamas critics and allegedly escapist from the Gaza central prison 
who were accused of being informants for Israel while others were part of the PA 
security forces; two dozen men were abducted and then shot dead while many others 
were severely beaten, tortured or shot in the kneecap rendering them permanently 
disabled (Amnesty International, 2009). It is this among other factors that Hamas 
must reform and re-examine its priorities, whether it is to be seen as a government 
that acts responsibly for the good of its people or whether they choose to engage in 
two struggles that are diminishing their legitimacy and goes against the principles that 
have aided them to get where they are now as a just and popular movement.   
 
The second reason for successful ideologies was examined previously in the paper 
and disproved, that of the illusory form of ideologies which entails a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that legitimizes the defensive stance against a foreign enemy through a 
process of othering which could in turn even provoke the enemy to methodologically 
adopt or believe in the rhetoric to a point where pacifism can be replaced with 
militancy, a similar notion to Lacan’s ‘gaze’ (Snyder, 2006:316).  The third concept is 
beheld in cultural preconceptions, a variety of self feeding ideologies that are 
supported by the beliefs or based on familiar ideas that are accessible to the general 
public, which can indoctrinate the propaganda either in ethno or religious centric lines 
resonating in a fulfillment of what is believed to be general norms of the culture 
(Snyder, 2006:316). And what better concept can there be than that of freedom and 
right to land, a universal characteristic that is common in almost all contemporary 
conflicts.  Finally and most vital for success is the ‘social utility’ of the ideology for 
its intended target group what Mann explains as 
  
‘An ideological legitimation for private activity outside authoritative hierarchies or an ethical basis for 
stable relations of reciprocity that underpin market transactions.’   (Snyder, 2006:316). 
 
The social utility of the ideology plays a significant role in the effectiveness of the 
demand for ideology and better explains the reasons as to why do followers follow? 
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Imperatively this is not to mean that followers are sheep, lead on by a shepherd, their 
respective role in the acceptance of ideology consumes a large portion and will in 
cases influence how the ideology develops.  The two logics that consequently arise 
from analyzing the utility side show that their motivation creates themes that fit to 
their needs, as mentioned previously with Christianity, alternatively cultural meanings 
and preconceptions exert more effort in the process rendering other salvation religions 
or ideologies such as Buddhism and Jain asceticism from Hindu cosmology to 
flourish under such conditions (Snyder, 2006:317). Stark in Snyder (2006) is a strong 
believer in the social utility of ideology he even chose to use the same cases presented 
by Mann to develop further the reasoning behind the importance of utility over 
pedigree for ideological efficiency, as he explains that Christianity challenged the 
overwhelming pedigree of the Roman empire and ancient polygamist ideals, 
furthermore, Christianity required the exclusive conversion away from these 
hegemonic understandings into a community built through normative bonds that 
incubate collective action and the provision/distribution of goods within a particular 
group, a prime example of how qualitative leaps in ideology occur within a network  
(Snyder, 2006:318).   
 
The expansion of socially utilized ideologies comes through two forms of effects; 
competition and demonstration, taking place within the network in the form of 
collective action. Increases are directly correlated to the motivational levels of the 
mobilized group towards the network’s goals through a reduction of opportunism and 
shirking or the tapping into of emotions that tie families together (read: culture) or 
linking the practical objectives to ‘high energy motivators’ such as religion or God 
(Snyder, 2006:319). The creation of a collective is an imbuement of cooperative 
norms with sacred force to find resolve, however that notion is weaker at the track 
laying stage but can be inferred later on, as did Hamas by utilizing ostracism as a 
means of substantiating the killing of so-called brand of ‘traitors’ in Gaza or the 
events that culminated in the expulsion of Fatah, both noticeably similar to the 
persecution of Brahmin in the Hindu faith, basically fusing a fear of repercussions and 
forming an adhesive for those incorporated so as to avoid any decentralization 
(Snyder, 2006:320). In this case ideology also works to stratify society and should no 
longer be permitted as change for the sake of change as they are as efficient as their 
local competitors, which leads to the self realization that no one ideology is more 
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altruistic than another, but in a few cases they may override existing ideologies 
because of the purpose they portray and as such need competition for their own 
survival. Which is why recent changes and shifts in intra-politics in the Palestine 
political sphere with the engagement in reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas 
supported by all Arab states is seen as a positive change away from 
‘moderate/rejection’ views towards Hamas, including the engagement of the US in 
this matter, even if this is just a beginning to a longer intra-struggle, however, these 
relations as unfruitful as they seem at the moment could provide initial ground for the 
acceptance of Hamas ideology and reforming their structure and would work as a 
catalyst in constructing change that does not recreate a hegemonic organization from 
their counter-hegemonic cultural roots (Lynch, 2009). 
 
 
Gazans: Are they Blindly Following a Frankenstein? 
 
 
According to a survey conducted by Jeroen Gunning of which results are shown in 
Heiberg (2007: 129) at the Islamic University in Gaza in 1997 several findings 
indicate an anomaly to what is widely accepted to be the image of Hamas, as the 
install base of support for Hamas comes from the refugee community compared to 
Fatah supporters that come from small villages with typically low numbers of 
refugees. Hamas supporters are religious with a recorded 73 percent positive 
responses compared to the 0.2 percent that were not religious at all.  Yet, religion 
does not necessarily mean the same thing to all respondents as 38 percent selected 
‘Islamization’ as the most important issue facing Palestine, compared to the 45 
percent of the religious respondents indicating that peace, human rights and the 
economy was of higher importance.  Furthermore, when Hamas supporters were 
asked what religion meant to them, 33 percent chose ‘integrity’ as a core moral 
understanding of the religion signifying a somewhat democratic tendency or approach 
to their religiosity, especially when 55 percent of the supporters also select modernity 
compared to the 5 percent that chose religious people to be the most influential 
institution with regards to their political views (Heiberg, 2007:129-130). 
 
Hamas, proves to be not just a hostage of public opinion, but as a former pluralistic 
political organization, it has shown that it respects the interests of its constituency, as 
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it did in the 2003 ceasefire, when 73 percent of respondents to a poll stated that if 
Hamas continues to foil plans for peace talks, internal strife would be inevitable and a 
lack of support for the movement would grow (Gunning in Heiberg, 2007:138). The 
intentions of Hamas for doing so whether as strategic political maneuvering or 
genuine pluralism cannot be fully identified, either way, the wishes of the population 
in Gaza were respected and represented by their popular organization, which are all 
signs of democratic and not autocratic forms of governance (Gunning in Heiberg, 
2007:138).  The unequivocal founding of Hamas on political acclimatization and 
support base means that change can occur based on these two variables.  While the 
political realm continues to be very volatile, the people’s frustrations with the 
protraction of the war could be enough incentive to change the political situation if 
democratic institutions are in place ushering for normalizations based on the 
respective communities and the downplaying of an exasperated personalized conflict 
between the State of Israel, Hamas and its rivaling political party Fatah. A conflict 
that has shrunk the humanitarian space and is ambivalent to the respect of human life 
and dignity. The lack of political backing and actions taken by political entities 
eroded the humanitarian space making it hard to access aid and information for both 
the international development agencies and the victims they are bound to protect 
making the demonstrative aspect of ideologies of war for protection fragile and 
paradoxical (Von Pilar, 1999: 8). 
  
Everything seems to be understood from its contradictions, Hamas while playing the 
popular support card is using its newly acquired powers to crush any form of 
opposition.  From their history as a counter hegemonic elite they have mutated into 
the one thing they were adamant on modifying.  Is it power that lead to this distortion 
or is it a sense of leadership? And what does leadership entail, the brutal use of force? 
Gandhi had immense powers at his disposal, yet chose leadership instead, why? Was 
he thinking about ruling his people? Or salvation for his people? I think its obvious, 
no matter what the turnout was with concessions made of parts of India to Pakistan, 
that his choice was to trust and lead rather than the confrontation of his opponents. 
Not so many people have been so close to approaching sainthood, but if Hamas is 
propagating a similar discipline, then there is no room for the malice that is reported 
in the Amnesty International Report. Hamas in Gaza, with their recent acclaim of 
power, a position that eventually should be changed if their sentiment is to lead and 
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not control as they frequently state. It is no wonder that when the SOLIYA facilitators 
were asked in a poll whether they believed that Hamas was acting responsibly for 
their people, that all non-Arab facilitators with one exception thought they were not, 
not to be misinterpreted as a lack of awareness of the Palestinian rights to a state and 
their humiliating siege, but a moral awareness that violence does not solve the conflict 
and in fact endangers the livelihood of the people.  
 
Table. 1(b): SOLIYA facilitator responses to poll on whether Hamas was acting 
responsibly towards its constituency 
  
Nationality Gender Is Hamas acting responsibly 
towards the people in Gaza? 
Why? 
Italian F No - 
German M - - 
Egyptian M Yes Resistance legitimate 
Italian F No No value for individuals liberties and 
violent form of resistance incites more 
conflict 
German F No - 
American M No Use of violence incites more conflict 
American M No Not recognizing Israel 
American/ 
Australian 
F No Use of Violence, strategic manipulation 
of Ideology 
American M No - 
American F No Use of violence persuades Israeli 
retaliation 
American M No Violence inciting more conflict 
Estonian F No Violence harms the conditions of the 
people 
French/ 
American 
F No - 
American F No - 
Egyptian F Yes Resistance is legitimate and much 
needed 
Romanian M No Use of violence creates more conflict 
and harms the people 
French M No Violence not the best form of resistance 
Lebanese / 
American 
F No - 
French F No - 
American F - Media distortion and cannot be sure 
Egyptian F Yes Resistance legitimate but still 
politically naïve 
Egyptian F Yes Resistance important for Palestinian 
survival 
Egyptian M Yes Resistance movement not a government 
French M No Use of violence and unrecognizing of 
Israel 
Egyptian F No More interested in political survival 
than people’s well being 
Bangladesh F No Not enough devotion to domestic social 
and economic policy and more political 
maneuvering 
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French F Yes - 
German F Both Great at humanitarian work but violent 
tactics incite Israeli retaliation and 
endangers the lives of Gazans 
 
 
Furthermore, what was less surprising was the dominant view of Arab respondents, 
obviously more empathetic to the cause and emotionally attached to the conflict to 
receive the question not in terms of Hamas’ governance policy but in terms of 
resistance, which was rarely contested by the remaining facilitators, whom almost all 
of which empathize with the Palestinian people and are well aware of the views of 
Noam Chomsky and Robert Finklestein in debates and lectures, that argue that the 
latest attacks on Gaza were clearly and explicitly documented to have been 
premeditated and not reactionary to Hamas rocket fire and that the actual breaking of 
the ceasefire was deliberately planned by the targeted assassination of Hamas leaders. 
These facilitators were all well trained to not accept what is presented as ‘truth’ in 
mainstream news media and as such are highly critical of both Hamas and Israel, yet 
their opinions show, that Hamas as it is proceeding and reacting to events pertaining 
to the conflict is in no way providing security or the long awaited freedom of both 
respective populations.  The positive feedback that pertains to the effectiveness of an 
ideology, occurs only when there is an increasing ‘returns to scale’ where the benefits 
outweigh the inputs leveraged for the ideology in terms of its followers (Snyder, 
2006:320). To date the consequent choice or strategy of confrontation for the sake of 
dignity of the so-called ‘Arab/Muslim pride’ has provided the population with death. 
 
What Palestinians are yet to realize is as much as the State of Israel can be 
pronounced as a violator of human rights laws within the conflict, so too has Hamas 
with its failure in providing protection and inflaming the conflict by extraditing the 
right to life, due process of the law, prohibition of torture and degrading treatment as 
well as the right to freedom of religion (Slim, 2004). The Religious aspects of their 
ideology although have been argued to be politicized and not doctrinal, yet alienates a 
Christian community within their population, when instead what is needed is to 
provide more social cohesion through coalitions to establish a homogenous political 
identity that can deliberate with the outside world and Israel.  Israel on the other hand 
can afford to do so for they are, after all, a revival of the Jewish state, whether that 
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phenomena should be adjudicated in a similar fashion to the fears of a revival of an 
Islamic state on the same land is left to the readers to decide. 
 
Social constructivists maintain that social facts such as identity and interests are 
comprised of norms and therefore the ‘is’ is sufficed by an ‘ought’, while Realists 
view social norms as a superstructure that rationalizes the social facts as in the 
readings of Weber and Marx, however both views do not disregard the ‘ought’ 
emerging from an ‘ is’ premise (Snyder, 2006:322). Yet it is important to keep in 
mind David Hume’s dictum in Snyder (2006), that one cannot properly derive an 
‘ought’ conclusion from an ‘is’ premise’ alone because of the ever changing variables 
that are underlying in an ‘is’. There is no certainty in reading events, accommodating 
different interpretations or readings, for as much certainty we can derive from the ‘is’ 
we can equally falsify such claims with our doubts of intentions behind actions taking 
place, good examples could be the explicit statements made by Hamas officials with 
regards to the end of violence if Israel was to recognize all the rights of the 
Palestinian people, according to the governing international laws that submit to the 
1967 borders.  If that were completely true then it becomes obvious that Israel is the 
wrong doer, however, the rhetoric remains inclusive of all Palestine pre-1948, and as 
such reinforces the Israeli doubts and rightfully so, under the conditions of realist 
thinking. Yet the recognition of Israel should only flow from a change in beliefs of 
the population and not a sense of surrender to daily humiliations.  Mann believes that 
neither the ‘is’ or the ‘ought’ has primacy over the other but would rather want to see 
ideology more as a means of persuasion by conflating both the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
 
‘[Through] interactive and co-constitutive of social power networks. An Ideologically 
animated expansion of social power depends on the coming together of a latent potential for 
collective action in a social network, the motivation of a group of entrepreneurs to organize 
that collective action, and the provision of a normatively infused ideology that effectively 
overcomes barriers to collective action’  (Snyder, 2006:322) 
 
 
Habits forged from cultural preconditioning and the use of force or even direct mutual 
reciprocity alone cannot overcome the dilemmas of society needed for survival 
against opportunism; transcendental meanings and norms that serve the paramount 
purpose of people’s well being, making social constructivism see social reality as a 
construction of norms through culture that helps both create and shift meanings within 
social groups, enabling a cross cultural dialogue to set their agendas, such as the 
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vanguard institutions, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have put in 
practical terms (Snyder, 2006:324). While Realists still believe that anarchy gives rise 
to the inescapable logic of fear and insecurity, as they believe that culture cannot 
diminish these effects and ironically even the most idealist of realists rely on military 
and economic coercion to unite the global community (Snyder, 2006:324). Regardless 
of the lack of scientific proof that military might can be attributed to peace making or 
keeping as purported in the realist paradigm, Constructivism as Snyder (2006) 
suggests is the only tangible form of logic that would prevent the occurrence or 
reoccurrence of conflict and that human resource strategies that are in tune with the 
constructivist tradition would have sharp improvements on a network’s efficiency 
(Snyder, 2006:325). Not to go as far and claim that constructivism is an altruistic 
solution to conflict in international relations, for their occurrence is as inevitable as 
our own existence, which will hardly be abolished, but we cannot dismiss the 
opportunity provided by this school in focusing on the exceptions to rules and the 
frequency of their application in curtailing world wide conflicts by acknowledging the 
Hobbesian trends of understanding existential questions but also knowing that the one 
percent counter reasoning for the human mind should not be limited to chance, but 
should be the goal that politics, especially in a time of conflict, should always thrive 
towards. 
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Metaphorical Euphemisms and 
Concluding Remarks: 
 
 
 
The persistent calls for war on both sides puts the brunt toll of suffering on the 
citizens, what Hamas lacks in their vision is that the protection of its population is 
primarily dependant on the prevention of conflicts or crisis and not the reactionary 
defensive actions taken. ‘Power, as the outside world keeps telling Hamas, means 
accepting responsibilities too’ (The Economist, 2006). More importantly is the 
responsibility for their people, who under the beleaguered conditions have accepted a 
life of self-imprisonment ushering in a period of civil unrest. On the threshold of Civil 
War, one must ask, what are Fatah and Hamas squabbling over? Is it political survival 
or gains? A sandbox equivalent of sibling rivalry over who gets to open the Christmas 
present first, not knowing what will be inside the parcel and the delusional beliefs in a 
Santa Claus.    
 
It is not denied that the situation in Gaza is as is often described ‘an open-air prison’ 
but what must be understood is what constitutes this prison? Is it the forceful physical 
jailing of an entire race, or the synoptical view in which Palestinians and Hamas alike 
have explored their existence from.  What Hamas should have done with Gaza is not 
enroll in a new set of conflicts with Fatah and Israel, but work much harder with or 
without the support of the international community to prove that the uncertainties they 
hold against their future are false; A chance to prove oneself against all hardships and 
show restrain against the so-called jailers?  Furthermore, what is even more curious 
about this situation is why do inmates choose the strongest as their protector/leader? 
As is the case with Hamas, does belonging to a group than can bear arms satisfy our 
needs for security? or is it wise leadership and neutrality as implied by countries such 
as Sweden, Switzerland and Costa Rica that ensures such due process? Would it not 
be reciprocally beneficial for Hamas to indoctrinate such principles in their ideology? 
Metaphorically speaking, and with no disrespect intended, Hamas represents a lion 
whose relation with nature can either be that of a caged zoo animal, a circus act, or 
co-existence in the wild. While obviously the panoptical view towards Hamas 
chooses to have it caged, yet Hamas with its realistic reactionary policies to events is 
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only delivering to commands uttered by the Gazans and State of Israel in what can 
only be called an ‘act’, of self defense or violence is irrelevant, when in fact, what is 
most promising for their ideology and acceptance levels is to choose to be as if they 
were in the wild, ignoring their surroundings and living on subsistence, but respected 
by all to ensure their survival.   
 
The heroism subscribed to the sacrifice of life in name of God, religion, country and 
any other hyper-masculine definition cannot be permitted in constructivism, it is fair 
to say that Jesus Christ sacrificed himself to save humanity, but that never implied 
sacrifices on a battlefield, or even the more questionable targeting of civilian 
populations.  Imperatively, what does the sacrifice accomplish? In no way is armed 
resistance by Hamas going to achieve the aspirations that they wish for and will 
probably only manage to retain some of the Palestinian rights in a distant future and 
nothing even marginal to what they fully deserve, if ever. These forms of identity 
politics and processes of ‘othering’ neglect ‘truth’ for the sake of individual 
accomplishment and interests, as Israeli’s and Palestinians are blinded by their thirst 
for self satisfaction that to achieve one’s goals they must squander the others, a zero 
sum game that begs the question of why do people choose to identify themselves in 
groups in the first place? Even if the world was divided into two camps, the 
warmongering humans and the docile peace-lovers, wouldn’t they eventually end up 
fighting over whether violence against others is morally acceptable or not, a future 
that not only proves the contradictions inherent in our beliefs but as an oxymoron 
shows the limitations of identity politics.    
 
Without venturing too deep on why Hamas acts in a violent manner or whether it is in 
retaliation or retribution, one important phenomena must be highlighted, and that is 
the popularity and empathy gained from non-violent means of resistance.  There is a 
reason why the monks in Tibet and Gandhi were enigmatic in capturing the global 
consciousness over current militant movements such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, PKK 
in Turkey, FARC in Colombia, as well as Hamas.  That is not to say that restrain 
either has provided durable solutions to such protracted crisis or conflicts, looking 
closer at the Tibetan issue and especially that of the West Papuans who’s quest for 
recognition is not even acknowledged but even suppressed by global moral bodies 
such as the UN, compared to more violent movements in East Timor which reached 
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independence.  But, if we were to advocate for traditional realist logic then armed 
resistance is probably the best first stage to reach any cessation objectives.  Hamas 
recognizing such sentiments, tried restraining themselves after the deliberate 
assassination of its spiritual leader Ahmed Yassin, a move that the Israeli state 
quickly recognized as a win due to its tightening security defenses.  Simultaneously, 
Hamas also in the last war on Gaza, claimed a political win for the annihilation of its 
infrastructure and loss of lives, a celebration that induces lifting an eyebrow in 
discontent, but still managed to gain more sympathetic votes from the global 
community.  While that could be relatively true, the apparent shirking of 
responsibility lies with its people, who lost even more, because of Hamas’ continuous 
rocket fire in a losing war that could have resulted in larger international support, if 
only, through constructivism, Hamas would realize that the pictures that hijacked the 
news on a daily premise were exacerbated by a position of an armed aggression of 
defenseless people calling on their moral consciousness’ and not a sign of weakness. 
Otherwise, Hamas remains in the shadows of al-Qaida, and while most empathize 
with afghani people, none have for the Taliban or al-Qaida, and for good reason, the 
Palestinian question and Hamas, should never be correlated with these dilemmas, 
under the pretence of Islamic association. 
 
Conflict is resolved with visions that are principled by visionaries, people who 
socially construct reality to befit a situation that can be tolerated by even their worst 
enemies.  Realism is unable to achieve such, because of its insistence on the ‘now’ 
and real time events in formulating recipes that help band-aid open wounds, covering 
the essence and severity of the gash, by announcing what is ‘real’ to be the truth. As if 
adding salt to a sweet dish can make it sour. Their strategies render a short 
sightedness in changing the status quo, yet they still dominate the international 
relations paradigm with a few exceptions in foreign policy that have managed to 
overcome this threshold and re-invent not only themselves but the path that 
humankind must take if we are to exceed the constraints of the ‘is’ in the ‘now’ and 
come up with the anticipated ‘transcendental is’ that constructivism accessibly 
promotes through advocating cultural (ex)change that redefines meanings by 
upholding the ethics of social relations that are beneficial to all, rather than self 
defeating animosity.  Exceptions are not a minimal probability of events that can 
occur, but they should be the sought after norm of human interaction, for the time 
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being it seems that we are dictated and ruled by military and war machines in our 
advent search for security, but with non-lasting results. While it is maintained that 
Hamas has not been acting in the best interest of their people, their popularity 
shadows the harsh conditions that the Gazans have had to endure for decades.  While 
this research might seem relatively inconclusive for not explicitly recommending a set 
of remedies to be administered, that is because by doing so it would claim that 
cultural change is not self induced, which is far from what this paper is repeatedly 
implying by avoiding impulsive didactics. And while I am not a proponent of either 
ideologies or activities embedded in Hamas, the State of Israel or Fatah, I am equally 
not against them either, but hope that in reviewing their claims, especially those of 
Hamas, critically and discursively that I do fairness to the cause of the Palestinian and 
Israeli people alike, and implore others from within the Israeli scholarly institutions to 
use constructivist’s holistic expression and perspective, as a means to reform their 
State, find just and fair solutions to the plight of both populations, that has been 
consequential to the ‘spectacle’ we call the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 59 
Bibliography 
 
 
Beverley, John (1998).  Theses on Subalternity, representation, and politics.  Postcolonial Studies, Vol 1, No 3, pp 
305-319. 
 
Brysk, Allison - Parsons, Craig - Sandholtz, Wagne (2002). European Journal of International Relations. 2002, Vol 
8(2): Sage Publications. 
 
Bullington, Jennifer - Karlsson, Gunnar (1984).  Introduction to phenomenological research. Scandinavian Journal 
of Psychology, Vol. 25. 
 
Chalmers, Alan (2004). What is this thing called science? (3ed) London: Open University Press.  
 
Chehab, Zaki (2007). Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies. New York: I.B.Tauris & 
Co Ltd. New York. 
 
Chomsky, Noam (2009).  Lecture at MIT center for international studies 13/1/2009 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uuWm3G1FZvU 
 
Delanty, Gerard (2000).  Social science: beyond constructivism and realism (Concepts in the Social Sciences). 
Excerpts. London: Open University Press. 
 
Esposito, John L (2007). ‘It’s the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy.’  
The Harvard International Review (http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1453) 
 
‘Former Amb. Martin Indyk vs. Author Norman Finkelstein: A Debate on Israel’s Assault on Gaza and the US 
Role in the Conflict.’ (2009) Democracy Now, January 08, 2009 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/1/8/former_amb_martin_indyk_vs_author 
 
Gerges, Fawaz A. (2006). ‘Is political Islam on the march?’ The Christian Science Monitor.  June 06, 2006 edition 
(http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0606/p09s02-coop.html) 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. (1971). ‘The Intellectuals’, in selections from the Prison Notebooks.  Translated and Edited by 
Q. Hoare and G.N.Smith. New York: International Publishers 
 
Hadid, Diaa - Barzak, Ibrahim (2009). ‘Sick Gazans victims of Hamas-Fatah power struggle.’ Associated Press 28 
April 2009. 
(http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hSdSiGNczUEq7wNLMLLDzk0CW4iAD97RAL9G0) 
 
 ‘Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History.’ (2004) International Crisis Group (ICG), Middle 
East/North Africa Briefing N°12, 20 April 2004 
 
Joffe, Josef (2005). ‘A World Without Israel.’ Foreign Policy Journal. January/February 2005. 
(http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=2737&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.p
hp?story_id=2737) 
 
Khan, Muqtedar. (2001). ‘Understanding the Roots of Muslim Rage’. Scoop independent news, 8 October 2001. 
(http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0110/S00044.htm) 
 
Lacan, Jacques “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a  (1973)” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI: The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, 67 ~ 119. New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1998. 
 
Latham, Andrew (2002). Warfare transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ 
European Journal of International Relations. 2002, Vol 8(2): Sage Publications. 
 
Loomba, Ania (2005). Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., UK.  
 
Lynch, Marc (2009). ‘Towards a Palestinian Accord.’ Foreign Policy 02/27/2009. 
 
Lynch, Marc (2002). ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement.’ European Journal of 
International Relations. 2002, Vol 8(2): Sage Publications. 
 
  
 60 
Makdisi, George - Dabashi Hamid.(1992) ‘The Rise of Humanism in Islam and the West, with Special Reference to 
Scholasticism.’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, Volume 112, Issue 1, p 135-137, JSTOR. 
 
‘Interviews from Gaza: What Hammas Wants and Palestinians Options Under Siege.’ (2002). Middle East Policy 
Council (MEPC). Volume IX, December 2002, Number 4. (http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol9/0212_gaess.asp) 
 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (2003). Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Owen, Roger. ‘Towering misrepresentation.’ Al-Ahram Weekly Online. 28 March - 3 April 2002, Issue No.579 
 
‘Palestinian Authority: Hamas' deadly campaign in the shadow of the war in Gaza.’ (2009) Media Advisory 
Amnesty International: Media Briefing AI Index: MDE 21/001/2009 10 February 2009 
 
Reinhart, Tanya (2005). Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948. (2ed). New York: Seven Stories Press, 
New York. 
 
Sabiq, Sayyid (1987). Fiqh as-Sunnah: The Book of Jihad. (8ed). Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi. Volume 3, 
Number 7, Lebanon. 
 
Siegman, Henry (2006). ‘Hamas: The Last Chance For Peace?’ The New York Review Of Books. Volume 53, 
Number 7, April 27, 2006. (http://www.nybooks.com/articles /18939) 
 
Simms, Rupe (2002). “Islam is Our Politics”: a Gramscian Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928-1953). 
Social Compass; 49; 563.  
http://scp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/49/4/563 
 
Slim, Hugo – Eguren, Luis Enrique (2004). Humanitarian Protection: A Guidance Booklet. London: ALNAP, 
Overseas Development Institute. London, UK. 
Snyder, Jack - Hall, John A - Schroeder, Ralph. (2006). An Anatomy of Power: The social theory of Michael 
Mann. (in ed) Cambrdige University Press.  
Sonn, Tamara (2002) ‘Interpreting Islam: Bandali Jawzi's Islamic Intellectual History.’ International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Volume 34, Issue  2. 
 
Taheri, Amir (2004). ‘Islam & Democracy: The Impossible Union.’ Sunday Times May 23, 2004 
(http://www.hvk.org/articles/0504/113.html) 
 
‘Leaders: The Hamas Conundrum; Israel and Palestine.’ (2006). The Economist. London: June 17, 2006. Vol. 
379, Iss. 8482; pg.14.  
Thies, Cameron G. Progress (2002). ‘History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The case of the 
Idealist-Realist Debate.’ European Journal of International Relations. 2002, Vol 8(2): Sage Publications. 
 
‘Understanding Islamism.’ (2005) International Crisis Group (ICG). Middle East/North Africa Report N°37, 2 
March 2005 
 
Von Pilar, Ulrike and Pia Pragenberg (1999). ‘Humanitarian Space Under Siege: Some Remarks from an Aid 
Agency’s Perspective.’ Background Paper prepared for the Symposium,, Europe and Humanitarian Aid – What 
Future? Learning from Crisis, 22 and 23 April 1999 in Bad Neuenahr. 
Walliman, Nicholas (2006). Social Research Method, London: Sage Publication, UK. 
Wright, Ann. (2009). ‘Under Seige Again, But Gaza Will Not Die.’ February 11, 2009. CommonDreams.org. 
(http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/02/11-11) 
 
Wright, Q (1955). The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
